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Is “the theory of everything” merely the ultimate ensemble theory?
Max Tegmark
Institute for Advanced Study, Olden Lane, Princeton, NJ 08540; max@ias.edu
We discuss some physical consequences of what might be
called “the ultimate ensemble theory”, where not only worlds
corresponding to say different sets of initial data or different
physical constants are considered equally real, but also worlds
ruled by altogether different equations. The only postulate
in this theory is that all structures that exist mathemati-
cally exist also physically, by which we mean that in those
complex enough to contain self-aware substructures (SASs),
these SASs will subjectively perceive themselves as existing in
a physically “real” world. We find that it is far from clear that
this simple theory, which has no free parameters whatsoever,
is observationally ruled out. The predictions of the theory
take the form of probability distributions for the outcome of
experiments, which makes it testable. In addition, it may be
possible to rule it out by comparing its a priori predictions
for the observable attributes of nature (the particle masses,
the dimensionality of spacetime, etc.) with what is observed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the ultimate hope for physicists is that we
will one day discover what is jocularly referred to as a
TOE, a “Theory of Everything”, an all-embracing and
self-consistent physical theory that summarizes every-
thing that there is to know about the workings of the
physical world. Almost all physicists would undoubtedly
agree that such a theory is still conspicuous with its ab-
sence, although the agreement is probably poorer on the
issue of what would qualify as a TOE. Although the re-
quirements that
• it should be a self-consistent theory encompassing
quantum field theory and general relativity as spe-
cial cases and
• it should have predictive power so as to be falsifi-
able in Popper’s sense
are hardly controversial, it is far from clear which of our
experimental results we should expect it to predict with
certainty and which it should predict only in a statistical
sense. For instance, should we expect it to predict the
masses of the elementary particles (measured in dimen-
sionless Planck units, say) from first principles, are these
masses free parameters in the theory, or do they arise
from some symmetry-breaking process that can produce
a number of distinct outcomes so that the TOE for all
practical purposes merely predicts a probability distribu-
tion [1–5]?
A. A classification of TOEs
Let us divide TOEs into two categories depending on
their answer to the following question: Is the physical
world purely mathematical, or is mathematics merely a
useful tool that approximately describes certain aspects
of the physical world? More formally, is the physical
world isomorphic to some mathematical structure? For
instance, if it were not for quantum phenomena and the
problem of describing matter in classical theories, a ten-
able TOE in the first category would be one stating that
the physical world was isomorphic to a 3+1-dimensional
pseudo-Riemannian manifold, on which a number of ten-
sor fields were defined and obeyed a certain system of
partial differential equations. Thus the broad picture in
a category 1 TOE is this:
• There are one or more mathematical structures
that exist not only in the mathematical sense, but
in a physical sense as well.
• Self-aware substructures (SASs) might inhabit
some of these structures, and we humans are ex-
amples of such SASs.
In other words, some subset of all mathematical struc-
tures (see Figure 1 for examples) is endowed with an
elusive quality that we call physical existence, or PE for
brevity. Specifying this subset thus specifies a category
1 TOE. Since there are three disjoint possibilities (none,
some or all mathematical structures have PE), we obtain
the following classification scheme:
1. The physical world is completely mathematical.
(a) Everything that exists mathematically exists
physically.
(b) Some things that exist mathematically exist
physically, others do not.
(c) Nothing that exists mathematically exists
physically.
2. The physical world is not completely mathematical.
The beliefs of most physicists probably fall into categories
2 (for instance on religious grounds) and 1b. Category
2 TOEs are somewhat of a resignation in the sense of
giving up physical predictive power, and will not be fur-
ther discussed here. The obviously ruled out category
1c TOE was only included for completeness. TOEs in
the popular category 1b are vulnerable to the criticism
(made e.g. by Wheeler [6], Nozick [7] and Weinberg [8])
that they leave an important question unanswered: why
is that particular subset endowed with PE, not another?
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FIG. 1. Relationships between various basic mathematical structures. The arrows generally indicate addition of new
symbols and/or axioms. Arrows that meet indicate the combination of structures — for instance, an algebra is a vector space
that is also a ring, and a Lie group is a group that is also a manifold.
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What breaks the symmetry between mathematical struc-
tures that would a priori appear to have equal merit?
For instance, take the above-mentioned category 1b TOE
of classical general relativity. Then why should one set
of initial conditions have PE when other similar ones
do not? Why should the mathematical structure where
the electron/proton mass ratio mp/me ≈ 1836 have PE
when the one with mp/me = 1996 does not? And
why should a 3+1-dimensional manifold have PE when a
17+5-dimensional one does not? In summary, although
a category 1b TOE may one day turn out to be correct,
it may come to appear somewhat arbitrary and thus per-
haps disappointing to scientists hoping for a TOE that
elegantly answers all outstanding questions and leaves no
doubt that it really is the ultimate TOE.
In this paper, we propose that category 1a is the cor-
rect one. This is akin to what has been termed “the prin-
ciple of fecundity” [7], that all logically acceptable worlds
exist, although as will become clear in the discussion of
purely formal mathematical structures in Section II, the
1a TOE involves no difficult-to-define vestige of human
language such as “logically acceptable” in its definition.
1a can also be viewed as a form of radical Platonism, as-
serting that the mathematical structures in Plato’s realm
of ideas, the Mindscape of Rucker [9], exist “out there”
in a physical sense [10], akin to what Barrow refers to as
“pi in the sky” [11,12].
Since 1a is (as 1c) a completely specified theory, in-
volving no free parameters whatsoever, it is in fact a
candidate for a TOE. Although it may at first appear as
though 1a is just as obviously ruled out by experience as
1c, we will argue that this is in fact far from clear.
B. How to make predictions using this theory
How does one make quantitative predictions using the
1a TOE? In any theory, we can make quantitative pre-
dictions in the form of probability distributions by using
Bayesean statistics1. For instance, to predict the classi-
cal period T of a Foucault pendulum, we would use the
equation
T = 2pi
√
L
g
. (1)
Using probability distributions to model the errors in our
measurements of the length L and the local gravitational
acceleration g, we readily compute the probability dis-
tribution for T . Usually we only care about the mean
〈T 〉 and the standard deviation ∆T (“the error bars”),
and as long as ∆T/T ≪ 1, we get the mean by inserting
1 In the Bayesean view, probabilities are merely subjective
quantities, like odds, useful for making predictions.
the means in equation (1) and ∆T/T from the standard
expression for the propagation of errors. In addition to
the propagated uncertainty in the prior observations, the
nature of the mathematical structure itself might add
some uncertainty, as is the case in quantum mechanics.
In the language of the previous section, both of these
sources of uncertainty reflect our lack of knowledge as to
which of the many SASs in the mathematical structure
corresponds to the one making the experiment: imper-
fect knowledge of field quantities (like g) corresponds to
uncertainty as to where in the spacetime manifold one is,
and quantum uncertainty stems from lack of knowledge
as to which branch of the wavefunction one is in (after
the measurement).
In the 1a TOE, there is a third source of uncertainty as
well: we do not know exactly which mathematical struc-
ture we are part of, i.e., where we are in a hypothetical
expansion of Figure 1 containing all structures. Clearly,
we can eliminate many options as inconsistent with our
observations (indeed, many can of course be eliminated
a priori as “dead worlds” containing no SASs at all —
for instance, all structures in Figure 1 are presumably
too simple to contain SASs). If we could examine all of
them, and some set of mathematical structures remained
as candidates, then they would each make a prediction
for the form of equation (1), leaving us with a probabil-
ity distribution as to which equation to use. Including
this uncertainty in the probability calculation would then
give us our predicted mean and error bars.
Although this prescription may sound unfamiliar, it is
quite analogous to what we do all the time. We usually
imagine that the fine structure constant α has some def-
inite value in the mathematical structure that describes
our world (or at least a value where the fundamental un-
certainty is substantially smaller than the measurement
errors in our current best estimate, 1/137.0359895). To
reflect our measurement errors on α, we therefore cal-
culate error bars as if there were an entire ensemble of
possible theories, spanning a small range of α-values. In-
deed, this Bayesean procedure has already been applied
to ensembles of theories with radically different values
of physical constants [4,13]. According to the 1a TOE,
we must go further and include our uncertainty about
other aspects of the mathematical structure as well, for
instance, uncertainty as to which equations to use. How-
ever, this is also little different from what we do anyway,
when searching for alternative models.
C. So what is new?
Since the above prescription was found to be so similar
to the conventional one, we must address the following
question: can the 1a TOE be distinguished from the oth-
ers in practice, or is this entire discussion merely a useless
metaphysical digression?
As discussed above, the task of any theory is to com-
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pute probability distributions for the outcomes of future
experiments given our previous observations. Since the
correspondence between the mathematical structure and
everyday concepts such as “experiment” and “outcome”
can be quite subtle (as will be discussed at length in Sec-
tion III), it is more appropriate to rephrase this as fol-
lows: Given the subjective perceptions of a SAS, a theory
should allow us to compute probability distributions for
(at least certain quantitative aspects of) its future per-
ceptions. Since this calculation involves summing over
all mathematical structures, the 1a TOE makes the fol-
lowing two predictions that distinguish it from the others
categories:
• Prediction 1: The mathematical structure de-
scribing our world is the most generic one that is
consistent with our observations.
• Prediction 2: Our observations are the most
generic ones that are consistent with our existence.
In both cases, we are referring to the totality of all obser-
vations that we have made so far in our life. The nature
of the set of all mathematical structures (over which we
need some form of measure to formalize what we mean
by generic) will be discussed at length in Section II.
These two predictions are of quite different character.
The first one offers both a useful guide when search-
ing for the ultimate structure (if the 1a TOE is correct)
and a way of predicting experimental results to poten-
tially rule out the 1a TOE, as described in Section III.
The second one is not practically useful, but provides
many additional ways of potentially ruling the theory
out. For instance, the structure labeled “general relativ-
ity” in Figure 1 contains the rather arbitrary number 3
as the dimensionality of space. Since manifolds of arbi-
trarily high dimensionality constitute equally consistent
mathematical structures, a 3-dimensional one is far from
“generic” and would have measure zero in this family
of structures. The observation that our space appears
three-dimensional would therefore rule out the 1a TOE
if the alternatives were not inconsistent with the very ex-
istence of SASs. Intriguingly, as discussed in Section IV,
all higher dimensionalities do appear to be inconsistent
with the existence of SASs, since among other things,
they preclude stable atoms.
D. Is this related to the anthropic principle?
Yes, marginally: the weak anthropic principle must be
taken into account when trying to rule the theory out
based on prediction 2.
Prediction 2 implies that the 1a TOE is ruled out if
there is anything about the observed Universe that is
surprising, given that we exist. So is it ruled out? For in-
stance, the author has no right to be surprised about facts
that a priori would seem unlikely, such as that his grand-
parents happened to meet or that the spermatozoid car-
rying half of his genetic makeup happened to come first
in a race agains millions of others, as long as these facts
are necessary for his existence. Likewise, we humans have
no right to be surprised that the coupling constant of the
strong interaction, αs, is not 4% larger than it is, for if it
were, the sun would immediately explode (the diproton
would have a bound state, which would increase the solar
luminosity by a factor 1018 [14]). This rather tautological
(but often overlooked) statement that we have no right to
be surprised about things necessary for our existence has
been termed the weak anthropic principle [15]. In fact,
investigation of the effects of varying physical parameters
has gradually revealed that [16–18]
• virtually no physical parameters can be changed by
large amounts without causing radical qualitative
changes to the physical world.
In other words, the “island” in parameter space that sup-
ports human life appears to be quite small. This small-
ness is an embarrassment for TOEs in category 1b, since
such TOEs provide no answer to the pressing question of
why the mathematical structures possessing PE happen
to belong to that tiny island, and has been hailed as sup-
port for religion-based TOEs in category 2. Such “design
arguments” [17] stating that the world was designed by a
divine creator so as to contain SASs are closely related to
what is termed the strong anthropic principle [15], which
states that the Universe must support life. The smallness
of the island has also been used to argue in favor of var-
ious ensemble theories in category 1b, since if structures
with PE cover a large region of parameter space, it is not
surprising if they happen to cover the island as well. The
same argument of course supports our 1a TOE as well,
since it in fact predicts that structures on this island (as
well as all others) have PE.
In conclusion, when comparing the merits of TOE 1a
and the others, it is important to calculate which aspects
of the physical world are necessary for the existence of
SASs and which are not. Any clearly demonstrated fea-
ture of “fine tuning” which is unnecessary for the exis-
tence of SASs would immediately rule out the 1a TOE.
For this reason, we will devote Section IV to exploring the
“local neighborhood” of mathematical structures, to see
by how much our physical world can be changed without
becoming uninhabitable.
E. How this paper is organized
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II discusses which structures exist mathemat-
ically, which defines the grand ensemble of which our
world is assumed to be a member. Section III discusses
how to make physical predictions using the 1a TOE. It
comments on the subtle question of how mathematical
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structures are perceived by SASs in them, and proposes
criteria that mathematical structures should satisfy in or-
der to be able to contain SASs. Section IV uses the three
proposed criteria to map out our local island of habitabil-
ity, discussing the effects of varying physical constants,
the dimensionality of space and time, etc. Finally, our
conclusions are summarized in section V.
II. MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURES
Our proposed TOE can be summarized as follows:
• Physical existence is equivalent to mathematical ex-
istence.2
What precisely is meant by mathematical existence, or
ME for brevity? A generally accepted interpretation of
ME is that of David Hilbert:
• Mathematical existence is merely freedom from con-
tradiction.
In other words, if the set of axioms that define a mathe-
matical structure cannot be used to prove both a state-
ment and its negation, then the mathematical structure
is said to have ME.
The purpose of this section is to remind the non-
mathematician reader of the purely formal foundations of
mathematics, clarifying how extensive (and limited) the
“ultimate ensemble” of physical worlds really is, thereby
placing Nozick’s notion [7] of “all logically acceptable
worlds” on a more rigorous footing. The discussion is
centered around Figure 1. By giving examples, we will
illustrate the following points:
• The notion of a mathematical structure is well-
defined.
• Although a rich variety of structures enjoy mathe-
matical existence, the variety is limited by the re-
quirement of self-consistency and by the identifica-
tion of isomorphic ones.
• Mathematical structures are “emergent concepts”
in a sense resembling that in which physical struc-
tures (say classical macroscopic objects) are emer-
gent concepts in physics.
2 Tipler has postulated that what he calls a simulation
(which is similar to what we call a mathematical structure)
has PE if and only if it contains at least one SAS [21]. From
our operational definition of PE (that a mathematical struc-
ture has PE if all SASs in it subjectively perceive themselves
as existing in a physically real sense), it follows that the dif-
ference between this postulate and ours is merely semantical.
• It appears likely that the most basic mathematical
structures that we humans have uncovered to date
are the same as those that other SASs would find.
• Symmetries and invariance properties are more the
rule than the exception in mathematical structures.
A. Formal systems
For a more rigorous and detailed introduction to formal
systems, the interested reader is referred to pedagogical
books on the subject such as [19,20].
The mathematics that we are all taught in school is an
example of a formal system, albeit usually with rather
sloppy notation. To a logician, a formal system consists
of
• A collection of symbols (like for instance “∼”, “ 7→”
and “X”) which can be strung together into strings
(like “∼∼ X 7→ X” and “XXXXX”)
• A set of rules for determining which such strings
are well-formed formulas, abbreviated WFFs and
pronounced “woofs” by logicians
• A set of rules for determining which WFFs are the-
orems
B. Boolean algebra
The formal system known as Boolean algebra can be
defined using the symbols “∼”, “∨”, “[”, “]” and a num-
ber of letters “x”, “y”, ... (these letters are referred to
as variables). The set of rules for determining what is a
WFF are recursive:
• A single variable is a WFF.
• If the strings S and T are WFFs, then the strings
[∼ S] and [S ∨ T ] are both WFFs.
Finally, the rules for determining what is a theorem con-
sist of two parts: a list of WFFs which are stated to be
theorems (the WFFs on this list are called axioms), and
rules of inference for deriving further theorems from the
axioms. The axioms are the following:
1. [[x ∨ x] 7→ x]
2. [x 7→ [x ∨ y]]
3. [[x ∨ y] 7→ [y ∨ x]]
4. [[x 7→ y] 7→ [[z ∨ x] 7→ [z ∨ y]]]
The symbol “ 7→” appearing here is not part of the for-
mal system. The string “x 7→ y” is merely a convenient
abbreviation for “[∼ x] ∨ y”. The rules of inference are
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• The rule of substitution: if the string S is a WFF
and the string T is a theorem containing a variable,
then the string obtained by replacing this variable
by S is a theorem.
• Modus ponens: if the string [S 7→ T ] is a theorem
and S is a theorem, then T is a theorem.
Two additional convenient abbreviations are “x&y” (de-
fined as “∼ [[∼ x] ∨ [∼ y]]” and “x ≡ y” (defined as
“[x 7→ y]&[y 7→ x]”). Although customarily pronounced
“not”, “or”, “and”, “implies” and “is equivalent to”, the
symbols ∼, ∨, &, 7→ and ≡ have no meaning whatever
assigned to them — rather, any “meaning” that we chose
to associate with them is an emergent concept stemming
from the axioms and rules of inference.
Using nothing but these rules, all theorems in Boolean
algebra textbooks can be derived, from simple strings
such as “[x ∨ [∼ x]]” to arbitrarily long strings.
The formal system of Boolean algebra has a number
of properties that gives it a special status among the in-
finitely many other formal systems. It is well-known that
Boolean algebra is complete, which means that given an
arbitrary WFF S, either S is provable or its negation,
[∼ S] is provable. If any of the four axioms above were
removed, the system would no longer be complete in this
sense. This means that if an additional axiom S is added,
it must either be provable from the other axioms (and
hence unnecessary) or inconsistent with the other ax-
ioms. Moreover, it can be shown that “[[x&[∼ x]] 7→ y]”
is a theorem, i.e., that if both a WFF and its negation
is provable, then every WFF becomes provable. Thus
adding an independent (non-provable) axiom to a com-
plete set of axioms will reduce the entire formal system to
a banality, equivalent to the trivial formal system defined
by “all WFFs are theorems” 3. Thus the formal system
of Boolean algebra is not as arbitrary as it may at first
seem. In fact, it is so basic that almost all formal systems
deemed complex enough by mathematicians to warrant
their study are obtained by starting with Boolean alge-
bra and augmenting it with further symbols and axioms.4
For this reason, it appears at the bottom of the “tree” of
structures in Figure 1.
3 Our definition of a mathematical structure having PE was
that if it contained a SAS, then this SAS would subjectively
perceive itself as existing. This means that Hilbert’s definition
of mathematical existence as self-consistency does not matter
for our purposes, since inconsistent systems are too trivial to
contain SASs anyway. Likewise, endowing “equal rights” to
PE to formal systems below Boolean algebra, where negation
is not even defined and Hilbert’s criterion thus cannot be ap-
plied, would appear to make no difference, since these formal
systems seem to be far too simple to contain SASs.
4As we saw, adding more axioms to Boolean algebra without
adding new symbols is a losing proposition.
C. What we mean by a mathematical structure
The above-mentioned example of Boolean algebra il-
lustrates several important points about formal systems
in general. No matter how many (consistent) axioms are
added to a complete formal system, the set of theorems
remains the same. Moreover, there are in general a large
number of different choices of independent axioms that
are equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same set
of theorems, and a systematic attempt to reduce the the-
orems to as few independent axioms as possible would
recover all of these choices independently of which one
was used as a starting point. Continuing our Boolean
algebra example, upgrading &, 7→ and ≡ to fundamen-
tal symbols and adding additional axioms, one can again
obtain a formal system where the set of theorems re-
mains the same. Conversely, as discovered by Sheffer,
an equivalent formal system can be obtained with even
fewer symbols, by introducing a symbol “|” and demot-
ing “∼ x” and “x ∨ y” to mere abbreviations for “x|x”
and “[x|x]|[y|y]”, respectively. Also, the exact choice of
notation is of course completely immaterial — a formal
system with “%” in place of “ 7→” or with the bracket
system eliminated by means of reverse Polish notation
would obviously be isomorphic and thus for mathemat-
ical purposes one and the same. In summary, although
there are many different ways of describing the math-
ematical structure known as Boolean algebra, they are
in a well-defined sense all equivalent. The same can be
said about all other mathematical structures that we will
be discussing. All formal systems can thus be subdivided
into a set of disjoint equivalence classes, such that the sys-
tems in each class all describe the same structure. When
we speak of a mathematical structure, we will mean such
an equivalence class, i.e., that structure which is indepen-
dent of our way of describing it. It is to this structure
that our 1a TOE attributes physical existence.
D. “Mathematics space” and its limits
If all mathematical structures have PE, then it is
clearly desirable to have a crude overview of what math-
ematical structures there are. Figure 1 is by no means
such a complete overview. Rather, it contains a selec-
tion of structures (solid rectangles), roughly based on
the Mathematics Subject Classification of the American
Mathematical Society. They have been ordered so that
following an arrow corresponds to adding additional sym-
bols and/or axioms. We will now discuss some features
of this “tree” or “web” that are relevant to the 1a TOE,
illustrated by examples.
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1. Lower predicate calculus and beyond
We will not describe the WFF rules for the formal sys-
tems mentioned below, since the reader is certainly famil-
iar with notation such as that for parentheses, variables
and quantifiers, as well as with the various conventions
for when parentheses and brackets can be omitted. For
instance, within the formal system of number theory de-
scribed below, a logician would read
P (n) ≡ [(∀a)(∀b)[[a > 1]&[b > 1] 7→ a · b 6= n]] (2)
as P (n) being the statement that the natural number n is
prime, i.e., that for all natural numbers a and b exceeding
unity, a · b 6= n, and
[a > 0](∃b)(∃c)[P (b)&P (c)&[a+ a = b+ c]] (3)
as the (still unproven) Goldbach hypothesis that all
even numbers can be written as the sum of two primes.
(Again, we emphasize that despite that we convention-
ally read them this way, the symbols of a formal system
have no meaning whatsoever — the properties that we
humans coin words for merely emerge from the axioms
and rules of inference.)
Moving upward in Figure 1, the formal system known
as Lower Predicate Calculus is be obtained from Boolean
Algebra by adding quantifiers (∀ and ∃). One way of
doing this is to add the axioms
1. [(∀a)[A(a)]] 7→ A(b)
2. [(∀a)[A ∨B(a)] 7→ [A ∨ [(∀a)B(a)]]
and the rule that if A(a) is a theorem involving no quanti-
fyers for a, then (∀a)[A(a)] is a theorem— (∃a)[A(a)] can
then be taken as a mere abbreviation for ∼ (∀a)[∼ A(a)].
Virtually all mathematical structures above lower
predicate calculus in Figure 1 involve the notion of equal-
ity. The relation a = b (sometimes written as E(a, b)
instead) obeys the so called axioms of equality:
1. a = a
2. a = b 7→ b = a
3. [a = b]&[b = c] 7→ a = c
4. a = b 7→ [A(a) 7→ A(b)]
The first three (reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity)
make “=” a so-called equivalence relation, and the last
one is known as the condition of substitutivity.
Continuing upward in Figure 1, the formal system
known as Number Theory (the natural numbers under
addition and multiplication) can be obtained from Lower
Predicate Calculus by adding the five symbols “ = ”, “0”,
“′”, “ + ” and “ · ”, the axioms of equality, and the fol-
lowing axioms [19]:
1. ∼ [a′ = 0]
2. [a′ = b′] 7→ [a = b]
3. a+ 0 = a
4. a+ b′ = (a+ b)′
5. a · 0 = 0
6. a · b′ = a · b+ a
7. [A(0)&[(∀a)[A(a) 7→ A(a′)]]] 7→ A(b)
Convenient symbols like 1, 2, “ 6= ”, “ < ”, “ > ”, “ ≤ ”
and “ ≥ ” can then be introduced as mere abbreviations
— 1 as an abbreviation for 0′, 2 as an abbreviation for
0′′, “a ≤ b” as an abbreviation for “(∃c)[a+ c = b]”, etc.
This formal system is already complex enough to be able
to “talk about itself”, which formally means that Go¨dels
incompleteness theorem applies: there are WFFs such
that neither they nor their negations can be proven.
Alternatively, adding other familiar axioms leads to
other branches in Figure 1.
A slightly unusual position in the mathematical fam-
ily tree is that labeled by “models” in the figure. Model
theory (see e.g. [22]) studies the relationship between for-
mal systems and set-theoretical models of them in terms
of sets of objects and relations that hold between these
objects. For instance, the set of real numbers constitute
a model for the field axioms. In the 1a TOE, all mathe-
matical structures have PE, so set-theoretical models of a
formal system enjoy the same PE that the formal system
itself does.
FIG. 2. With too few axioms, a mathematical structure
is too simple to contain SASs. With too many, it becomes
inconsistent and thus trivial.
2. The limits of variety
The variety of mathematical structures, a small part
of which is illustrated in Figure 1, is limited in two ways.
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First of all, they are much fewer than the formal sys-
tems, since they are equivalence classes as described in
Section II C. For instance, natural numbers (under +
and ·) are a single mathematical structure, even though
there are numerous equivalent ways of axiomatizing the
formal system of number theory.
Second, the self-consistency requirement adds a nat-
ural cutoff as one tries to proceed too far along arrows
in Figure 1. If one keeps adding axioms in the attempt
to create a more complex structure, the bubble eventu-
ally bursts, as schematically illustrated in Figure 2. For
instance, consider the progression from semi-groups to
groups to finite groups to the specific case of the dodec-
ahedron group (a dashed rectangle in Figure 1), where
each successive addition of axioms has made the struc-
ture less general and more specific. Since the entire mul-
tiplication table of the dodecahedron group is specified,
any attempt to make the dodecahedron still more “spe-
cific” will make the formal system inconsistent, reducing
it to the banal one where all WWF’s are theorems.
Figure 1 also illustrates a more subtle occurrence of
such a “complexity cutoff”, where even adding new sym-
bols does not prevent a branch of the tree from ending.
Since a field is in a sense a double group (a group under
the 1st binary operation, and after removing its identity,
also a group under the 2nd), it might seem natural to
explore analogous triple groups, quadruple groups, etc.
In Figure 1, these structures are labeled “double fields”
and “triple fields”, respectively. A double field D has 3
binary operations, say ∆, + and ·, having identities that
we will denote ∞, 0 and 1, respectively, such that D un-
der ∆ and +, and D without ∞ under + and · are both
fields. A triple field is defined analogously. For simplic-
ity, we will limit ourselves to ones with a finite number
of elements. Whereas there is a rich and infinite variety
of finite fields (Galois Fields), it can be shown [23] that
(apart from a rather trivial one with 3 elements), there is
only one double field per Mersenne prime (primes of the
form 2n − 1), and it is not known whether there are in-
finitely many Mersenne primes. As to finite triple fields,
it can be shown [23] that there are none at all, i.e., that
particular mathematical structure in Figure 1 is incon-
sistent and hence trivial.
An analogous case of a “terminating branch” is found
by trying to extend the ladder of Abelian fields beyond
the sequence rational, real and complex numbers. By
appropriately defining =, + and · for quadruples (rather
than pairs) of real numbers, one obtains the field of
quaternions, also known as SU(2). However, the Abelian
property has been lost. Repeating the same idea for
larger sets of real numbers gives matrices, which do not
even form a field (since the sum of two invertible matrices
can be non-invertible).
E. The sense in which mathematical structures are
an emergent concept
Suppose a SAS were given the rules of some formal
system and asked to compile a catalog of theorems (for
the present argument, it is immaterial whether the SAS
is a carbon-based life-form like ourselves, a sophisticated
computer program or something completely different).
One can then argue that [24] it would eventually invent
additional notation and branches of mathematics beyond
this particular formal system, simply as a means of per-
forming its task more efficiently. As a specific example,
suppose that the formal system is Boolean algebra as we
defined it in Section II B, and that the SAS tries to make
a list of all strings shorter than some prescribed length
which are theorems (the reader is encouraged to try this).
After blindly applying the rules of inference for a while,
it would begin to recognize certain patterns and realize
that it could save considerable amounts of effort by in-
troducing convenient notation reflecting these patterns.
For instance, it would with virtual certainty introduce
some notation corresponding to “∼ [[∼ x] ∨ [∼ y]]” (for
which we used the abbreviation “ 7→”) at some point, as
well as notation corresponding what we called “&” and
“≡”. If as a starting point we had given the SAS the
above-mentioned Sheffer version of Boolean algebra in-
stead, it would surely have invented notation correspond-
ing to “∼” and ∨ as well. How much notation would it
invent? A borderline case would be something like writ-
ing “x ← y” as an “abbreviation” for “y 7→ x”, since
although the symbol “ ← ” is arguably helpful, its use-
fulness is so marginal that it is unclear whether it is worth
introducing it at all — indeed, most logic textbooks do
not.
After some time, the SAS would probably discover that
it’s task could be entirely automated by inventing the
concept of truth tables, where “[x∨ [∼ x]]” and its nega-
tion play the roles of what we call “true” and “false”.
Furthermore, when it was investigating WFFs containing
long strings of negations, e.g., “∼∼∼∼∼∼∼ [x∨ [∼ x]]”,
it might find it handy to introduce the notion of counting
and of even and odd numbers.
To further emphasize the same point, if we gave the
SAS as a starting point the more complex formal system
of number theory discussed above, it might eventually re-
discover a large part of mathematics as we know it to aid
it in proving theorems about the natural numbers. As
is well known, certain theorems about integers are most
easily proven by employing methods that use more ad-
vanced concepts such as real numbers, analytic functions,
etc. Perhaps the most striking such example to date is
the recent proof of Fermat’s last theorem, which employs
state-of-the-art methods of algebraic geometry (involv-
ing, e.g., semistable elliptic curves) despite the fact that
the theorem itself can be phrased using merely integers.
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F. What structures have we missed?
Conversely, the systematic study of virtually any more
complicated mathematical structure that did not explic-
itly involve say integers would lead a SAS to reinvent the
integers, since they are virtually ubiquitous. The same
could be said about most other basic mathematical struc-
tures, e.g., groups, algebras and vector spaces. Just as it
was said that “all roads lead to Rome”, we are thus argu-
ing that “all roads lead to the integers” and other basic
structures — which we therefore refer to as “emergent
concepts”.
If this point of view is accepted, then an immediate
conclusion is that all types of SASs would arrive at similar
descriptions of the “mathematics tree”. Thus although
one would obviously expect a certain bias towards being
more interested in mathematics that appears relevant to
physics, i.e., to the particular structure in which the SAS
resides, it would appear unlikely that any form of SASs
would fail to discover basic structures such as say Boolean
Algebra, integers and complex numbers. In other words,
it would appear unlikely that we humans have overlooked
any equally basic mathematical structures.
G. Why symmetries and ensembles are natural
Above we saw that a general feature of formal systems
is that all elements in a set are “born equal” – further
axioms are needed to discriminate between them. This
means that symmetry and invariance properties tend
to be more the rule than the exception in mathemati-
cal structures. For instance, a three-dimensional vector
space automatically has what a physicist would call rota-
tional symmetry, since no preferred direction appears in
its definition. Similarly, any theory of physics involving
the notion of a manifold will automatically exhibit in-
variance under general coordinate transformations, sim-
ply because the very definition of a manifold implies that
no coordinate systems are privileged over any other.
Above we also saw that the smaller one wishes the en-
semble to be, the more axioms are needed. Defining a
highly specific mathematical structure with built-in di-
mensionless numbers such as 1/137.0359895 is far from
trivial. Indeed, it is easy to prove that merely a denu-
merable subset of all real numbers (a subset of measure
zero) can be specified by a finite number of axioms 5, so
5 The proof is as follows. Each such number can be specified
by a LATeX file of finite length that gives the appropriate
axioms in some appropriate notation. Since each finite LATeX
file can be viewed as a single integer (interpreting all its bits
as as binary decimals), there are no more finite LATeX files
than there are integers. Therefore there are only countably
many such files and only countably many real numbers that
writing down a formal system describing a 1b TOE with
built-in “free parameters” would be difficult unless these
dimensionless numbers could all be specified “numerolog-
ically”, as Eddington once hoped.
III. HOW TO MAKE PHYSICAL PREDICTIONS
FROM THE THEORY
How does one use the Category 1a TOE to make phys-
ical predictions? Might it really be possible that a TOE
whose specification contains virtually no information can
nonetheless make predictions such as that we will per-
ceive ourselves as living in a space with three dimen-
sions, etc.? Heretic as it may sound, we will argue that
yes, this might really be possible, and outline a program
for how this could be done. Roughly speaking, this in-
volves examining which mathematical structures might
contain SASs, and calculating what these would subjec-
tively appear like to the SASs that inhabit them. By
requiring that this subjective appearance be consistent
with all our observations, we obtain a list of structures
that are candidates for being the one we inhabit. The fi-
nal result is a probability distribution for what we should
expect to perceive when we make an experiment, using
Bayesian statistics to incorporate our lack of knowledge
as to precisely which mathematical structure we reside
in.
A. The inside view and the outside view
A key issue is to understand the relationship between
two different ways of perceiving a mathematical struc-
ture. On one hand, there is what we will call the “view
from outside”, or the “bird perspective”, which is the way
in which a mathematician views it. On the other hand,
there is what we will call the “view from inside”, or the
“frog perspective”, which is the way it appears to a SAS in
it. Let us illustrate this distinction with a few examples:
1. Classical celestial mechanics
Here the distinction is so slight that it is easy to over-
look it altogether. The outside view is that of a set
of vector-valued functions of one variable, ri(t) ∈ R3,
i = 1, 2, ..., obeying a set of coupled nonlinear second
order ordinary differential equations. The inside view is
that of a number of objects (say planets and stars) at
can be specified “numerologically”, i.e., by a finite number fo
axioms. In short, the set of real numbers that we can specify
at all (
√
2, pi, the root of x7− ex, etc.) has Lebesgue measure
zero.
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locations r in a three-dimensional space, whose positions
are changing with time.
2. Electrodynamics in special relativity
Here one choice of outside view is that of a set of real-
valued functions Fµν and Jµ in R
4 which obey a cer-
tain system of Lorentz-invariant linear partial differen-
tial equations; the Maxwell equations and the equation
of motion (Jµ,ν − Fµν)Jν = 0. The correspondence be-
tween this and the inside view is much more subtle than
in the above example, involving a number of notions that
may seem counter-intuitive. Arguably, the greatest dif-
ficulty in formulating this theory was not in finding the
mathematical structure but in interpreting it. Indeed,
the correct equations had to a large extent already been
written down by Lorentz and others, but it took Albert
Einstein to explain how to relate these mathematical ob-
jects to what we SASs actually perceive, for instance by
pointing out that the inside view in fact depended not
only on the position of the SAS but also on the velocity
of the SAS. A second bold idea was the notion that al-
though the bird perspective is that of a four-dimensional
world that just is, where nothing ever happens, it will
appear from the frog perspective as a three-dimensional
world that keeps changing.
3. General relativity
Here history repeated itself: although the mathematics
of the outside view had largely been developed by others
(e.g., Minkowski and Riemann), it took the genius of Ein-
stein to relate this to the subjective experience from the
frog perspective of a SAS. As an illustration of the dif-
ficulty of relating the inside and outside views, consider
the following scenario. On the eve of his death, New-
ton was approached by a genie who granted him one last
wish. After some contemplation, he made up his mind:
“Please tell me what the state-of-the-art equations of
gravity will be in 300 years.”
The genie scribbled down the Einstein field equations and
the geodesic equation on a sheet of paper, and being a
kind genie, it also gave the explicit expressions for the
Christoffel symbols and the Einstein tensor in terms of
the metric and explained to Newton how to translate the
index and comma notation into his own mathematical no-
tation. Would it be obvious to Newton how to interpret
this as a generalization of his own theory?
4. Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics
Here the difficulty of relating the two viewpoints
reached a new record high, manifested in the fact that
physicists still argue about how to interpret the theory
today, 70 years after its inception. Here one choice of out-
side view is that of a Hilbert space where a wave function
evolves deterministically, whereas the inside view is that
of a world where things happen seemingly at random,
with probability distributions that can be computed to
great accuracy from the wave function. It took over 30
years from the birth of quantum mechanics until Everett
[25] showed how the inside view could be related with
this outside view. Discovering decoherence, which was
crucial for reconciling the presence of macrosuperposi-
tions in the bird perspective with their absence in the frog
perspective, came more than a decade later [26]. Indeed,
some physicists still find this correspondence so subtle
that they prefer the Copenhagen interpretation with a
Category 2 TOE where there is no outside view at all.
5. Quantum gravity
Based on the above progression of examples, one would
naturally expect the correct theory of quantum gravity to
pose even more difficult interpretational problems, since
it must incorporate all of the above as special cases. A
recent review [27] poses the following pertinent question:
is the central problem of quantum gravity one of physics,
mathematics or philosophy? Suppose that on the eve of
the next large quantum gravity meeting, our friend the
genie broke into the lecture hall and scribbled the equa-
tions of the ultimate theory on the blackboard. Would
any of the participants realize what was being erased the
next morning?
B. Computing probabilities
Let us now introduce some notation corresponding to
these two viewpoints.
1. Locations and perceptions
Let X denote what a certain SAS subjectively per-
ceives at a given instant. To be able to predict X , we
need to specify three things:
• Which mathematical structure this SAS is part of
• Which of the many SASs in this structure is this
one
• Which instant (according to the time perception of
the SAS) we are considering.
We will label the mathematical structures by i, the SASs
in structure i by j and the subjective time of SAS (i, j) by
t — this is a purely formal labeling, and our use of sums
below in no way implies that these quantities are discrete
or even denumerably infinite. We will refer to the set of
all three quantities, L ≡ (i, j, t), as a location. If the
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world is purely mathematical so that a TOE in category
1 is correct, then specifying the location of a perception
is in principle sufficient to calculate what the perception
will be. Although such a calculation is obviously not
easy, as we will return to below, let us for the moment
ignore this purely technical difficulty and investigate how
predictions can be made.
2. Making predictions
Suppose that a SAS at location L0 has perceived Y
up until that instant, and that this SAS is interested in
predicting the perception X that it will have a subjec-
tive time interval ∆t into the future, at location L1. The
SAS clearly has no way of knowing a priori what the
locations L0 and L1 are (all it knows is Y , what it has
perceived), so it must use statistics to reflect this uncer-
tainty. A well-known law of probability theory tells us
that for any mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive set of possibilities Bi, the probability of an event A
is given by P (A) =
∑
i P (A|Bi)P (Bi). Using this twice,
we find that the probability of X given Y is
P (X |Y ) =
∑
L0
∑
L1
P (X |L1)P (L1|L0)P (L0|Y ). (4)
Since a SAS is by definition only in a single mathematical
structure i and since t1 = t0 +∆t, the second factor will
clearly be of the form
P (L1|L0) = P (i1, j1, t1|i0, j0, t0)
= δi0i1δ(t1 − t0 −∆t)P (j1|i0, j0). (5)
If, in addition, there is a 1-1 correspondence between
the SASs at t0 and t1, then we would have simply
P (j1|i0, j0) = δj1j2 . Although this is the case in, for
instance, classical general relativity, this is not the case
in universally valid quantum mechanics, as schematically
illustrated in Figure 3. As to the third factor in equa-
tion (4), applying Bayes’ theorem with a uniform prior for
the locations gives P (L0|Y ) ∝ P (Y |L0), so equation (4)
reduces to
P (X |Y ) ∝∑
ij0j1t
P (X |i, j1, t+∆t)P (j1|i, j0)P (Y |i, j0, t), (6)
where P (X |Y ) should be normalized so as to be a prob-
ability distribution for X . For the simple case when
P (j1|i0, j0) = δj1j2 , we see that the resulting equation
P (X |Y ) ∝
∑
ijt
P (X |i, j, t+∆t)P (Y |i, j, t) (7)
has quite a simple interpretation. Since knowledge of a
location L = (i, j, t) uniquely determines the correspond-
ing perception, the two probabilities in this expression
are either zero or unity. We have P (X |L) = 1 if a SAS
at location L perceives X and P (X |L) = 0 if it does not.
P (X |Y ) is therefore simply a sum giving weight 1 to all
cases that are consistent with perceiving Y and then per-
ceiving X a time interval ∆t later, normalized so as to be
a probability distribution over X . The interpretation of
the more general equation (6) is analogous: the possibil-
ity of “observer branching” simply forces us to take into
account that we do not with certainty know the location
L1 where X is perceived even if we know L0 exactly.
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FIG. 3. Whereas there is generally a 1-1 correspondence
between SASs at different times in classical general relativity
(GR), “observer branching” makes the situation more com-
plicated in quantum mechanics (QM).
3. How 1a and 1b TOEs differ
Equation (6) clarifies how the predictions from TOE
1a differ from those in 1b: whereas the sum should be
extended over all mathematical structures i in the for-
mer case, it should be restricted to a certain subset (that
which is postulated to have PE) in the latter case. In
addition, 1b TOEs often include prescriptions for how to
determine what we denote P (X |L), i.e., the correspon-
dence between the inside and outside viewpoints, the cor-
respondence between the numbers that we measure ex-
perimentally and the objects in the mathematical struc-
ture. Such prescriptions are convenient simply because
the calculation of P (X |L) is so difficult. Nonetheless, it
should be borne in mind that this is strictly speaking re-
dundant information, since P (X |L) can in principle be
computed a priori.
C. Inside vs. outside: what has history taught us?
In the past, the logical development has generally been
to start with our frog perspective and search for a bird
perspective (a mathematical structure) consistent with
it. To explore the implications of our proposed TOE us-
ing equation (6), we face the reverse problem: given the
latter, what can we say about the former? Given a math-
ematical structure containing a SAS, what will this SAS
perceive, i.e., what is P (X |L)? This question is clearly
relevant to all TOEs in category 1, including 1b. Indeed,
few would dispute that a 1b TOE would gain in elegance
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if any of its postulates in the above-mentioned “prescrip-
tion” category could be trimmed away with Occam’s ra-
zor by being shown to follow from the other postulates.
Perhaps the best guide in addressing this question is
what we have (arguably) learned from previous successful
theories. We discuss such lessons below.
1. Do not despair
Needless to say, the question of what a SAS would
perceive in a given mathematical structure is a very dif-
ficult one, which we are far from being able to answer
at the present time. Indeed, so far we have not even
found a single mathematical structure that we feel confi-
dent might contain SASs, since a self-consistent model of
quantum gravity remains conspicuous with its absence.
Nonetheless, the successes of relativity theory and quan-
tum mechanics have shown that we can make consider-
able progress even without having completely solved the
problem, which would of course involve issues as diffi-
cult as understanding the human brain. In these the-
ories, strong conclusions were drawn about what could
and could not be perceived that were independent of any
detailed assumption about the nature of the SAS. We list
a few examples below.
2. We perceive symmetry and invariance
As SASs, we can only perceive those aspects of the
mathematical structure that are independent of our no-
tation for describing it (which is tautological, since this
is all that has mathematical existence). For instance, as
described in section IIG, if the mathematical structure
involves a manifold, a SAS can only perceive properties
that have general covariance.
3. We perceive only that which is useful
We seem to perceive only those aspects of the math-
ematical structure (and of ourselves) that are useful
to perceive, i.e., which are relatively stable and pre-
dictable. Within the framework of Darwinian evolution,
it would appear as though we humans have been endowed
with self-awareness in the first place merely because cer-
tain aspects of our world are somewhat predictable, and
since this self-awareness (our perceiving and thinking) in-
creases our reproductive chances6. Self-awareness would
6 In the 1a TOE, where all mathematical structures exist,
some SASs presumably exist anyway, without having had any
evolutionary past. Nonetheless, since processes that increase
the capacity of SASs to multiply will have a dramatic effect
then be merely a side-effect of advanced information pro-
cessing. For instance, it is interesting to note that our
bodily defense against microscopic enemies (our highly
complex immune system) does not appear to be self-
aware even though our defense against macroscopic ene-
mies (our brain controlling various muscles) does. This
is presumably because the aspects of our world that are
relevant in the former case are so different (smaller length
scales, longer time scales, etc.) that sophisticated logical
thinking and the accompanying self-awareness are not
particularly useful here.
Below we illustrate this usefulness criterion with three
examples.
4. Example 1: we perceive ourselves as local
Both relativity and quantum mechanics illustrate that
we perceive ourselves as being “local” even if we are
not. Although in the bird perspective of general relativ-
ity, we are one-dimensional world lines in a static four-
dimensional manifold, we nonetheless perceive ourselves
as points in a three-dimensional world where things hap-
pen. Although a state where a person is in a superposi-
tion of two macroscopically different locations is perfectly
legitimate in the bird perspective of quantum mechanics,
both of these SASs will perceive themselves as being in
a well-defined location in their own frog perspectives. In
other words, it is only in the frog perspective that we
SASs have a well-defined “local” identity at all. Like-
wise, we perceive objects other than ourselves as local.
5. Example 2: we perceive ourselves as unique
We perceive ourselves as unique and isolated systems
even if we are not. Although in the bird perspective of
universally valid quantum mechanics, we can end up in
several macroscopically different configurations at once,
intricately entangled with other systems, we perceive our-
selves as remaining unique and isolated systems. What
appears as “observer branching” in the bird perspective,
appears as merely a slight randomness in the frog per-
spective. In quantum mechanics, the correspondence be-
tween these two viewpoints can be elegantly modeled
with the density matrix formalism, where the approxi-
mation that we remain isolated systems corresponds to
partial tracing over all external degrees of freedom.
on the various probabilities in equation (6), one might expect
the vast majority of all SASs to have an evolutionary past.
In other words, one might expect the generic SAS to perceive
precisely those aspects the mathematical structure which are
useful to perceive.
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6. Example 3: we perceive that which is stable
We human beings replace the bulk of both our “hard-
ware” (our cells, say) and our “software” (our memories,
etc.) many times in our life span. Nonetheless, we per-
ceive ourselves as stable and permanent [7]. Likewise, we
perceive objects other than ourselves as permanent. Or
rather, what we perceive as objects are those aspects of
the world which display a certain permanence. For in-
stance, as Eddington remarked [28], when observing the
ocean we perceive the moving waves as objects because
they display a certain permanence, even though the wa-
ter itself is only bobbing up and down. Similarly, we only
perceive those aspects of the world which are fairly stable
to quantum decoherence [26].
7. There can be ensembles within the ensemble
Quantum statistical mechanics illustrates that there
can be ensembles within an ensemble. A pure state can
correspond to a superposition of a person being in two
different cities at once, which we, because of decoher-
ence, count as two distinct SASs, but a density matrix
describing a mixed state reflects additional uncertainty
as to which is the correct wave function. In general, a
mathematical structure imay contain two SASs that per-
ceive themselves as belonging to completely disjoint and
unrelated worlds.
8. Shun classical prejudice
As the above discussion illustrates, the correspondence
between the inside and outside viewpoints has become
more subtle in each new theory (special relativity, gen-
eral relativity, quantum mechanics). This means that
we should expect it to be extremely subtle in a quantum
gravity theory and try to break all our shackles of precon-
ception as to what sort of mathematical structure we are
looking for, or we might not even recognize the correct
equations if we see them. For instance, criticizing the
Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics [25] on the
grounds that it is “too crazy” would reflect an impermis-
sible bias towards the familiar classical concepts in terms
of which we humans describe our frog perspective. In
fact, the rival Copenhagen interpretation of quantum me-
chanics does not correspond to a mathematical structure
at all, and therefore falls into category 2 [29,30]. Rather,
it attributes a priori reality to the non-mathematical frog
perspective (“the classical world”) and denies that there
is a bird perspective at all.
D. Which structures contain SASs?
Until now, we have on purpose been quite vague as to
what we mean by a SAS, to reduce the risk of tacitly as-
suming that it must resemble us humans. However, some
operational definition is of course necessary to be able to
address the question in the title of this section. Above
we asked what a SAS of a given mathematical structure
would perceive. A SAS definition allowing answers such
as “nothing at all” or “complete chaos” would clearly be
too broad. Rather, we picture a self-aware substructure
as something capable of some form of logical thought.
We take the property of being “self-aware” as implicitly
defined: a substructure is self-aware if it thinks that it is
self-aware. To be able to perceive itself as thinking (hav-
ing a series of thoughts in some logical succession), it ap-
pears as though a SAS must subjectively perceive some
form of time, either continuous (as we do) or discrete (as
our digital computers). That it have a subjective percep-
tion of some form of space, on the other hand, appears
far less crucial, and we will not require this. Nor will we
insist on many of the common traits that are often listed
in various definitions of life (having a metabolism, abil-
ity to reproduce, etc.), since they would tacitly imply a
bias towards SASs similar to ours living in a space with
atoms, having a finite lifetime, etc. As necessary condi-
tions for containing a SAS, we will require that a math-
ematical structure exhibit a certain minimum of merely
three qualities:
• Complexity
• Predictability
• Stability
What we operationally mean by these criteria is perhaps
best clarified by the way in which we apply them to spe-
cific cases in Section IV. Below we make merely a few
clarifying comments. That self-awareness is likely to re-
quire the SAS (and hence the mathematical structure
of which it is a part) to possess a certain minimum com-
plexity goes without saying. In this vein, Barrow has sug-
gested that only structures complex enough for Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem to apply can contain what we
call SASs [12], but this is of course unlikely to be a suf-
ficient condition. The other two criteria are only mean-
ingful since we required SASs to subjectively experience
some form of time.
By predictability we mean that the SAS should be able
to use its thinking capacity to make certain inferences
about its future perceptions. Here we include for us hu-
mans rather obvious predictions, such as that an empty
desk is likely to remain empty for the next second rather
than, say, turn into an elephant.
By stability we mean that a SAS should exist long
enough (according to its own subjective time) to be
able to make the above-mentioned predictions, so this is
strictly speaking just a weaker version of the predictabil-
ity requirement.
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E. Why introduce the SAS concept?
We conclude this section with a point on terminology.
The astute reader may have noticed that the various
equations in this section would have looked identical if
we have defined our observers as say “human beings”
or “carbon-based life-forms” instead of using the more
general term the “SAS”. Since our prior observations
Y include the fact that we are carbon-based, etc., and
since it is only Prediction 1 (mentioned in the introduc-
tion) that is practically useful, would it not be preferable
to eliminate the SAS concept from the discussion alto-
gether? This is obviously a matter of taste. We have
chosen to keep the discussion as general as possible for
the following reasons:
• The requirement that mathematical structures
should contain SASs provides a clean way of
severely restricting the number of structures to sum
over in equation (6) before getting into nitty-gritty
details involving carbon, etc., which can instead be
included as part of our observations Y .
• We wish to minimize the risk of anthropocentric
and “classical” bias when trying to establish the
correspondence between locations and perceptions.
The term SAS emphasizes that this is to be ap-
proached as a mathematics problem, since the ob-
server is nothing but part of the mathematical
structure.
• We wish to keep the discussion general enough to
be applicable even to other possible life-forms.
• The possibility of making a priori “Descartes” pre-
dictions, based on nothing but the fact that we exist
and think, offers a way of potentially ruling out the
1a TOE that would otherwise be overlooked.
IV. OUR “LOCAL ISLAND”
In section II, we took a top-down look at mathemat-
ical structures, starting with the most general ones and
specializing to more specific ones. In this section, we will
do the opposite: beginning with what we know about our
own mathematical structure, we will discuss what hap-
pens when changing it in various ways. In other words,
we will discuss the borders of our own “habitable island”
in the space of all mathematical structures, without be-
ing concerned about whether there are other habitable
islands elsewhere. We will start by discussing the effects
of relatively minor changes such as dimensionless contin-
uous physical parameters and gradually proceed to more
radical changes such as the dimensionality of space and
time and the partial differential equations. Most of the
material that we summarize in this section has been well-
known for a long time, so rather than giving a large num-
ber of separate references, we simply refer the interested
reader to the excellent review given in [17]. Other exten-
sive reviews can be found in [16,31,32], and the Resource
Letter [18] contains virtually all references prior to 1991.
We emphasize that the purpose of this section is not
to attempt to rigorously demonstrate that certain math-
ematical structures are devoid of SASs, merely to pro-
vide an overview of anthropic constraints and some crude
plausibility arguments.
A. Different continuous parameters
Which dimensionless physical parameters are likely to
be important for determining the ability of our Universe
to contain SASs? The following six are clearly important
for low-energy physics:
• αs, the strong coupling constant
• αw, the weak coupling constant
• α, the electromagnetic coupling constant
• αg, the gravitational coupling constant
• me/mp, the electron/proton mass ratio
• mn/mp, the neutron/proton mass ratio
We will use Planck units, so h¯ = c = G = 1 are not
parameters, and masses are dimensionless, making the
observed parameter vector
(αs, αw, α, αg,me/mp,mn/mp) ≈
(0.12, 0.03, 1/137, 5.9× 10−39, 1/1836, 1.0014). (8)
Note that mp is not an additional parameter, since mp =
α
1/2
g . In addition, the cosmological constant [13] and the
various neutrino masses will be important if they are non-
zero, since they can contribute to the overall density of
the universe and therefore affect both its expansion rate
and its ability to form cosmological large-scale structure
such as galaxies. How sensitive our existence is to the
values of various high-energy physics parameters (e.g.,
the top quark mass) is less clear, but we can certainly not
at this stage rule out the possibility that their values are
constrained by various early-universe phenomena. For
instance, the symmetry breaking that lead to a slight
excess of matter over anti-matter was certainly crucial
for the current existence of stable objects.
As was pointed out by Max Born, given thatmn ≈ mp,
the gross properties of all atomic and molecular sys-
tems are controlled by only two parameters: α and
β ≡ me/mp. Some rather robust constraints on these
parameters are illustrated by the four shaded regions in
Figure 4. Here we have compactified the parameter space
by plotting arctan[lg(β)] against arctan[lg(α)], where the
logarithms are in base 10, thus mapping the entire range
[0,∞] into the range [−pi/2, pi/2]. First of all, the fact
that α, β ≪ 1 is crucial for chemistry as we know it.
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In a stable ordered structure (e.g., a chromosome), the
typical fluctuation in the location of a nucleus relative
to the inter-atomic spacing is β1/4, so for such a struc-
ture to remain stable over long time scales, one must
have β1/4 ≪ 1. The figure shows the rather modest con-
straint β1/4 < 1/3. (This stability constraint also allows
replacing β by 1/β, which interchanges the roles of elec-
trons and nucleons.) In contrast, if one tried to build
up ordered materials using the strong nuclear force one
would not have this important stability, since neutrons
and protons have similar masses (this is why neither is
localized with precision in nuclei, which all appear fairly
spherically symmetric from the outside) [17].
FIG. 4. Constraints on α and β
Various edges of our “local island” are illustrated in
the parameter space of the fine structure constant α and
the electron/proton mass ratio β. The observed val-
ues (α, β) ≈ (1/137, 1/1836) are indicated with a filled
square. Grand unified theories rule out everything ex-
cept the narrow strip between the two vertical lines, and
Carter’s stellar argument predicts a point on the dashed
line. In the narrow shaded region to the very left, elec-
tromagnetism is weaker than gravity and therefore irrel-
evant.
The typical electron velocity in a hydrogen atom is α,
so α ≪ 1 makes small atoms nonrelativistic and atoms
and molecules stable against pair creation.
The third constraint plotted is obtained if we require
the existence of stars. Insisting that the lower limit on
the stellar mass (which arises from requiring the central
temperature to be high enough to ignite nuclear fusion)
not exceed the upper limit (which comes from requiring
that the star be stable) [17], the dependence on αg cancels
out and one obtains the constraint β ∼> α2/200.
A rock-bottom lower limit is clearly α ∼> αg, since
otherwise electrical repulsion would always be weaker
than gravitational attraction, and the effects of electro-
magnetism would for all practical purposes be negligible.
(More generally, if we let any parameter approach zero
or infinity, the mathematical structure clearly loses com-
plexity.)
If one is willing to make more questionable assump-
tions, far tighter constraints can be placed. For instance,
requiring a grand-unified theory to unify all forces at
an energy no higher than the Planck energy and re-
quiring protons to be stable on stellar timescales gives
1/180 ∼< α ∼< 1/85, the two vertical lines in the figure.
If it is true that a star must undergo a convective phase
before arriving at the main sequence in order to develop
a planetary system, then one obtains [15] the severe re-
quirement α12/β4 ∼ αg, which is plotted (dashed curve)
using the observed value of αg.
In addition to the above-mentioned constraints, a de-
tailed study of biochemistry reveals that many seemingly
vital processes hinge on a large number of “coincidences”
[17], ranging from the fact that water attains its maxi-
mum density above its freezing point to various chemical
properties that enable high-fidelity DNA reproduction.
Since all of chemistry is essentially determined by only
two free parameters, α and β, it might thus appear as
though there is a solution to an overdetermined problem
with much more equations (inequalities) than unknowns.
This could be taken as support for a religion-based cate-
gory 2 TOE, with the argument that it would be unlikely
in all other TOEs. An alternative interpretation is that
these constraints are rather weak and not necessary con-
ditions for the existence of SASs. In this picture, there
would be a large number of tiny islands of habitability in
the white region in Figure 4, and the SASs in other parts
of this “archipelago” would simply evolve by combining
chemical elements in a manner different from ours.
A similar constraint plot involving the strength of the
strong interaction is shown in Figure 5. Whether an
atomic nucleus is stable or not depends on whether the
attractive force between its nucleons is able to overcome
degeneracy pressure and Coulomb repulsion. The fact
that the heaviest stable nuclei contain Z ∼ 102 protons
is therefore determined by αs and α. If αs ∼< 0.3α1/2 (a
shaded region), not even carbon (Z = 5) would be sta-
ble [17], and it is doubtful whether the universe would
still be complex enough to support SASs. Alternatively,
increasing αs by a mere 3.7% is sufficient to endow the
diproton with a bound state [33]. This would have catas-
trophic consequences for stellar stability, as it would ac-
celerate hydrogen burning by a factor of 1018. In fact,
this would lead to a universe devoid of Hydrogen (and
thus free of water and organic chemistry), since all H
would be converted to diprotons already during big bang
nucleosynthesis. Reducing αs by 11% (horizontal line)
would unbind deuterium, without which the main nuclear
reaction chain in the sun could not proceed. Although it
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is unclear how necessary this is for SASs, “it is doubtful
if stable, long-lived stars could exist at all” [16].
FIG. 5. Constraints on α and αs
Various edges of our “local island” are illustrated in
the parameter space of the electromagnetic and strong
coupling constants, α and αs. The observed values
(α, αs) ≈ (1/137, 0.1) are indicated with a filled square.
Grand unified theories rule out everything except the nar-
row strip between the two vertical lines, and deuterium
becomes unstable below the horizontal line. In the nar-
row shaded region to the very left, electromagnetism is
weaker than gravity and therefore irrelevant.
Just as in Figure 4, we might expect a careful analy-
sis of the white region to reveal a large number of tiny
habitable islands. This time, the source of the many
delicate constraints is the hierarchical process in which
heavy elements are produced in stars, where it is suffi-
cient to break a single link in the reaction chain to ruin
everything. For instance, Hoyle realized that production
of elements heavier than Z = 4 (Beryllium) required a
resonance in the C12 nucleus at a very particular energy,
and so predicted the existence of this resonance before it
had been experimentally measured [34]. In analogy with
the “archipelago” argument above, a natural conjecture
is that if αs and α are varied by large enough amounts,
alternative reaction chains can produce enough heavy el-
ements to yield a complex universe with SASs.
Since it would be well beyond the scope of this paper
to enter into a detailed discussion of the constraints on all
continuous parameters, we merely list some of the most
robust constraints below and refer to [17,16] for details.
• αs: See Figure 5.
• αw: If substantially smaller, all hydrogen gets con-
verted to helium shortly after the Big Bang. If
much larger or much smaller, the neutrinos from
a supernova explosion fail to blow away the outer
parts of the star, and it is doubtful whether any
heavy elements would ever be able to leave the stars
where they were produced.
• α: See Figure 4 and Figure 5.
• αg: The masses of planets, organisms on their
surface, and atoms have the ratios (α/αg)
3/2 :
(α/αg)
3/4 : 1, so unless αg ≪ α, the hierar-
chies of scale that characterize our universe would
be absent. These distinctions between micro-
and macro- may be necessary to provide stability
against statistical 1/
√
N -fluctuations, as pointed
out by Schro¨dinger after asking “Why are atoms
so small?” [35]. Also note the Carter constraint in
Figure 4, which depends on αg.
• me/mp: See Figure 4.
• mn/mp: If mn/mp < 1 + β, then neutrons cannot
decay into protons and electrons, so nucleosynthe-
sis converts virtually all hydrogen into helium. If
mn/mp < 1− β, then protons would be able to de-
cay into neutrons and positrons, so there would be
no stable atoms at all.
B. Different discrete parameters
1. Different number of spatial dimensions
In a world with the same laws of physics as ours but
where the dimensionality of space n was different from
three, it it quite plausible that no SASs would be pos-
sible.7 What is so special about n = 3? Perhaps the
most striking property was pointed out by Ehrenfest in
1917 [37,38]: for n > 3, neither classical atoms nor plan-
etary orbits can be stable. Indeed, as described below,
quantum atoms cannot be stable either. These proper-
ties are related to the fact that the fundamental Green
function of the Poisson equation ∇2φ = ρ, which gives
the electrostatic/gravitational potential of a point parti-
cle, is r2−n for n > 2. Thus the inverse square law of
electrostatics and gravity becomes an inverse cube law if
n = 4, etc. When n > 3, the two-body problem no longer
has any stable orbits as solutions [39,40]. This is illus-
trated in Figure 6, where a swarm of light test particles
are incident from the left on a massive point particle (the
7This discussion of the dimensionality of spacetime is an
expanded version of [36].
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black dot), all with the same momentum vector but with
a range of impact parameters.
FIG. 6. The two body problem in four-dimensional space:
the light particles that approach the heavy one at the cen-
ter either escape to infinity or get sucked into a cataclysmic
collision. There are no stable orbits.
There are two cases: those that start outside the
shaded region escape to infinity, whereas those with
smaller impact parameters spiral into a singular collision
in a finite time. We can think of this as there being a
finite cross section for annihilation. This is of course in
stark contrast to the familiar case n = 3, which gives
either stable elliptic orbits or non-bound parabolic and
hyperbolic orbits, and has no “annihilation solutions” ex-
cept for the measure zero case where the impact parame-
ter is exactly zero. A similar disaster occurs in quantum
mechanics, where a study of the Schro¨dinger equation
shows that the Hydrogen atom has no bound states for
n > 3 [41]. Again, there is a finite annihilation cross
section, which is reflected by the fact that the Hydrogen
atom has no ground state, but time-dependent states of
arbitrarily negative energy. The situation in general rel-
ativity is analogous [41]. Modulo the important caveats
mentioned below, this means that such a world cannot
contain any objects that are stable over time, and thus
almost certainly cannot contain SASs.
There is also a less dramatic way in which n = 3 ap-
pears advantageous (although perhaps not necessary) for
SASs. Many authors (e.g., [37,38,42,43]) have drawn at-
tention to the fact that the wave equation admits sharp
and distortion-free signal propagation only when n = 3
(a property that we take advantage of when we see and
listen). In addition, the Weyl equation exhibits a special
“form stability” [44] for n = 3, m = 1.
FIG. 7. Constraints on the dimensionality of spacetime.
When the partial differential equations are elliptic or
ultrahyperbolic, physics has no predictive power for a
SAS. In the remaining (hyperbolic) cases, n > 3 fails on
the stability requirement (atoms are unstable) and n < 3
fails on the complexity requirement (no gravitational
attraction, topological problems). A 1+3-dimensional
spacetime is equivalent to a 3+1-dimensional one with
tachyons only, and may fail on the stability requirement.
What about n < 3? It has been argued [45] that or-
ganisms would face insurmountable topological problems
if n = 2: for instance, two nerves cannot cross. Another
problem, emphasized by Wheeler [46], is the well-known
fact (see e.g. [47]) that there is no gravitational force
in general relativity with n < 3. This may appear sur-
prising, since the Poisson equation of Newtonian gravity
allows gravitational forces for n < 3. The fact of the
matter is that general relativity has no Newtonian limit
for n < 3, which means that a naive Newtonian calcu-
lation would simply be inconsistent with observations.
In order for general relativity to possess a Newtonian
limit, there must be a coordinate system where the met-
ric tensor gµν approaches the Minkowski form far from
any masses, and the Newtonian gravitational potential φ
is then (apart from a factor of two) identified with the de-
viation of g00 from unity. However, a naive application of
Newtonian gravity shows that the inverse r2 law of n = 3
gets replaced by an inverse r law for n = 2, so instead of
approaching zero as r → ∞, φ diverges logarithmically.
A general relativistic solution for a static point particle in
2 dimensional space (which is mathematically equivalent
to the frequently studied problem of mass concentrated
on an infinite line, interpreted as a cosmic string) shows
that the surrounding space has no curvature (the Rie-
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mann tensor vanishes), which means that other particles
would not feel any gravitational attraction. Instead, the
surrounding spacetime has the geometry of a cone, so
that the total angle around the point mass is less than
360◦, again illustrating the global nature of gravity in two
dimensions and why there cannot be a Newtonian limit.
In summary, there will not be any gravitational attrac-
tion if space has less than 3 dimensions, which precludes
planetary orbits as well as stars and planets held together
by gravity and SASs being gravitationally bound to ro-
tating planets. We will not spend more time listing prob-
lems with n < 3, but simply conjecture that since n = 2
(let alone n = 1 and n = 0) offers vastly less complexity
than n = 3, worlds with n < 3 are just too simple and
barren to contain SASs.
For additional discussion of anthropic constraints on
n, see e.g. [17,48].
2. Different number of time dimensions
Why is time one-dimensional? In this section, we will
present an argument for why a world with the same
laws of physics as ours and with an n +m-dimensional
spacetime can only contain SASs if the number of time-
dimensions m = 1, regardless of the number of space-
dimensions n. Before describing this argument, which
involves hyperbolicity properties of partial differential
equations, let us make a few general comments about
the dimensionality of time.
Whereas the case n 6= 3 has been frequently discussed
in the literature, the case m 6= 1 has received rather
scant attention. This may be partly because the above-
mentioned correspondence between the outside and in-
side viewpoints is more difficult to establish in the lat-
ter case. When trying to imagine life in 4-dimensional
space, we can make an analogy with the step from a 2-
dimensional world to our 3-dimensional one, much as was
done in Edwin Abbot’s famous novel “Flatland”. But
what would reality appear like to a SAS in a manifold
with two time-like dimensions?
A first point to note is that even for m > 1, there is no
obvious reason for why a SAS could not nonetheless per-
ceive time as being one-dimensional, thereby maintain-
ing the pattern of having “thoughts” and “perceptions”
in the one-dimensional succession that characterizes our
own reality perception. If a SAS is a localized object, it
will travel along an essentially 1-dimensional (time-like)
world line through the n+m-dimensional spacetime man-
ifold. The standard general relativity notion of its proper
time is perfectly well-defined, and we would expect this
to be the time that it would measure if it had a clock and
that it would subjectively experience.
a. Differences when time is multidimensional Need-
less to say, many aspects of the world would nonetheless
appear quite different. For instance, a re-derivation of
relativistic mechanics for this more general case shows
that energy now becomes anm-dimensional vector rather
than a constant, whose direction determines in which
of the many time-directions the world-line will continue,
and in the non-relativistic limit, this direction is a con-
stant of motion. In other words, if two non-relativistic
observers that are moving in different time directions
happen to meet at a point in spacetime, they will in-
evitably drift apart in separate time-directions again, un-
able to stay together.
Another interesting difference, which can be shown by
an elegant geometrical argument [49], is that particles
become less stable when m > 1. For a particle to be
able to decay when m = 1, it is not sufficient that there
exists a set of particles with the same quantum numbers.
It is also necessary, as is well-known, that the sum of
their rest masses should be less than the rest mass of
the original particle, regardless of how great its kinetic
energy may be. When m > 1, this constraint vanishes
[49]. For instance,
• a proton can decay into a neutron, a positron and
a neutrino,
• an electron can decay into a neutron, an antiproton
and a neutrino, and
• a photon of sufficiently high energy can decay into
any particle and its antiparticle.
In addition to these two differences, one can concoct
seemingly strange occurrences involving “backward cau-
sation” when m > 1. Nonetheless, although such un-
familiar behavior may appear disturbing, it would seem
unwarranted to assume that it would prevent any form of
SAS from existing. After all, we must avoid the fallacy
of assuming that the design of our human bodies is the
only one that allows self-awareness. Electrons, protons
and photons would still be stable if their kinetic energies
were low enough, so perhaps observers could still exist in
rather cold regions of a world withm > 18 There is, how-
ever, an additional problem for SASs when m > 1, which
has not been previously emphasized even though the
mathematical results on which it is based are well-known.
It stems from the requirement of predictability which was
discussed in Section III.9 If a SAS is to be able to make
8 It is, however, far from trivial to formulate a quantum field
theory with a stable vacuum state when m > 1. A detailed
discussion of such instability problems with m > 1 is given
by Linde [3], also in an anthropic context, and these issues
are closely related to the ultrahyperbolic property described
below.
9 The etymology of predict makes it a slightly unfortunate
word to use in this context, since it might be interpreted as
presupposing a one-dimensional time. We will use it to mean
merely making inferences about other parts of the space-time
manifold based on local data.
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any use of its self-awareness and information-processing
abilities (let alone function), the laws of physics must be
such that it can make at least some predictions. Specif-
ically, within the framework of a field theory, it should
by measuring various nearby field values be able to com-
pute field values at some more distant space-time points
(ones lying along its future world-line being particularly
useful) with non-infinite error bars. Although this pre-
dictability requirement may sound modest, it is in fact
only met by a small class of partial differential equations
(PDEs), essentially those which are hyperbolic.
b. The PDE classification scheme All the mathemat-
ical material summarized below is well-known, and can
be found in more detail in [43]. Given an arbitrary second
order linear partial differential equation in Rd,
 d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
Aij
∂
∂xi
∂
∂xj
+
d∑
i=1
bi
∂
∂xi
+ c

u = 0, (9)
where the matrix A (which we without loss of generality
can take to be symmetric), the vector b and the scalar c
are given differentiable functions of the d coordinates, it
is customary to classify it depending on the signs of the
eigenvalues of A. The PDE is said to be
• elliptic in some region of Rd if they are all positive
or all negative there,
• hyperbolic if one is positive and the rest are negative
(or vice versa), and
• ultrahyperbolic in the remaining case, i.e., where at
least two eigenvalues are positive and at least two
are negative.
What does this have to do with the dimensionality of
spacetime? For the various covariant field equations
of nature that describe our world (the wave equation
u;µµ = 0, the Klein-Gordon equation u;µµ + m
2u = 0,
etc.10), the matrix A will clearly have the same eigenval-
ues as the metric tensor. For instance, they will be hy-
perbolic in a metric of signature (+− −−), correspond-
ing to (n,m) = (3, 1), elliptic in a metric of signature
(+++++), corresponding to (n,m) = (5, 0), and ultra-
hyperbolic in a metric of signature (+ +−−).
c. Well-posed and ill-posed problems One of the mer-
its of this standard classification of PDEs is that it deter-
mines their causal structure, i.e., how the boundary con-
ditions must be specified to make the problem well-posed.
10 Our discussion will apply to matter fields with spin as well,
e.g. fermions and photons, since spin does not alter the causal
structure of the solutions. For instance, all four components
of an electron-positron field obeying the Dirac equation satisfy
the Klein-Gordon equation as well, and all four components of
the electromagnetic vector potential in Lorentz gauge satisfy
the wave equation.
Roughly speaking, the problem is said to be well-posed
if the boundary conditions determine a unique solution
u and if the dependence of this solution on the bound-
ary data (which will always be linear) is bounded. The
last requirement means that the solution u at a given
point will only change by a finite amount if the bound-
ary data is changed by a finite amount. Therefore, even if
an ill-posed problem can be formally solved, this solution
would in practice be useless to a SAS, since it would need
to measure the initial data with infinite accuracy to be
able to place finite error bars on the solution (any mea-
surement error would cause the error bars on the solution
to be infinite).
d. The elliptic case Elliptic equations allow well-
posed boundary value problems. For instance, the d-
dimensional Laplace equation ∇2u = 0 with u specified
on some closed (d − 1)-dimensional hypersurface deter-
mines the solution everywhere inside this surface. On the
other hand, giving “initial” data for an elliptic PDE on
a non-closed surface, say a plane, is an ill-posed prob-
lem.11 This means that a SAS in a world with no time
dimensions (m=0) would not be able do make any infer-
ences at all about the situation in other parts of space
based on what it observes locally. Such worlds thus fail
on the above-mentioned predictability requirement, as il-
lustrated in Figure 7.
e. The hyperbolic case Hyperbolic equations, on the
other hand, allow well-posed initial-value problems. For
the Klein-Gordon equation in n+1 dimensions, specifying
initial data (u and u˙) on a region of a spacelike hypersur-
face determines u at all points for which this region slices
all through the backward light-cone, as long as m2 ≥ 0
— we will return to the Tachyonic case m2 < 0 below.
For example, initial data on the shaded disc in Figure 8
determines the solution in the volumes bounded by the
two cones, including the (missing) tips. A localized SAS
can therefore make predictions about its future. If the
matter under consideration is of such low temperature
that it is nonrelativistic, then the fields will essentially
contain only Fourier modes with wave numbers |k| ≪ m,
which means that for all practical purposes, the solution
at a point is determined by the initial data in a “causal-
ity cone” with an opening angle much narrower than 45◦.
For instance, when we find ourselves in a bowling alley
where no relevant macroscopic velocities exceed 10 m/s,
we can use information from a spatial hypersurface of 10
meter radius (a spherical volume) to make predictions an
entire second into the future.
11 Specifying only u on a non-closed surface gives an un-
derdetermined problem, and specifying additional data, e.g.,
the normal derivative of u, generally makes the problem over-
determined and ill-posed in the same way as the ultrahyper-
bolic case described below.
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FIG. 8. The causality structure for hyperbolic and ul-
tra-hyperbolic equations.
f. The hyperbolic case with a bad hypersurface In con-
trast, if the initial data for a hyperbolic PDE is specified
on a hypersurface that is not spacelike, the problem be-
comes ill-posed. Figure 8, which is based on [43], provides
an intuitive understanding of what goes wrong. A corol-
lary of a remarkable theorem by Asgeirsson [50] is that if
we specify u in the cylinder in Figure 8, then this deter-
mines u throughout the region made up of the truncated
double cones. Letting the radius of this cylinder approach
zero, we obtain the disturbing conclusion that providing
data in a for all practical purposes one-dimensional re-
gion determines the solution in a three-dimensional re-
gion. Such an apparent “free lunch”, where the solution
seems to contain more information than the input data,
is a classical symptom of ill-posedness. The price that
must be paid is specifying the input data with infinite
accuracy, which is of course impossible given real-world
measurement errors.12 Moreover, no matter how nar-
12 A similar example occurs if all we know about a mapping f
in the complex plane is that it is an analytic function. Writing
z = x + iy and f(x + iy) = u(x, y) + iv(x, y), where x, y, u
and v are real, the analyticity requirement corresponds to the
Cauchy-Riemann PDEs
∂u
∂x
=
∂v
∂y
,
∂u
∂y
= −
∂v
∂x
. (10)
It is well-known that knowledge of f in an infinitesimal neigh-
borhood of some point (for all practical purposes a zero-
dimensional region) uniquely determines f everywhere in the
complex plane. However, this important mathematical prop-
row we make the cylinder, the problem is always over-
determined, since data in the outer half of the cylinder
are determined by that in the inner half. Thus mea-
suring data in a larger region does not eliminate the ill-
posed nature of the problem, since the additional data
carries no new information. Also, generic boundary data
allows no solution at all, since it is not self-consistent.
It is easy to see that the same applies when specifying
“initial” data on part of a non-spacelike hypersurface,
e.g., that given by y = 0. These properties are analo-
gous in n+1-dimensions, and illustrate why a SAS in an
n + 1-dimensional spacetime can only make predictions
in time-like directions.
g. The ultrahyperbolic case Asgeirsson’s theorem ap-
plies to the ultrahyperbolic case as well, showing that ini-
tial data on a hypersurface containing both spacelike and
timelike directions leads to an ill-posed problem. How-
ever, since a hypersurface by definition has a dimension-
ality which is one less than that of the spacetime mani-
fold (data on a submanifold of lower dimensionality can
never give a well-posed problem), there are no spacelike
or timelike hypersurfaces in the ultrahyperbolic case, i.e.,
when the number of space- and time-dimensions both ex-
ceed one. In other words, worlds in the region labeled ul-
trahyperbolic in Figure 7 cannot contain SASs if we insist
on the above-mentioned predictability requirement. 13
Together with the above-mentioned complexity and sta-
bility requirements, this rules out all combinations (n,m)
in Figure 7 except (3, 1). We see that what makes the
number 1 so special is that a hypersurface in a manifold
has a dimensionality which is precisely 1 less than that of
the manifold itself (with more than one time-dimension,
a hypersurface cannot be purely spacelike).
h. Space-time dimensionality: summary Here we
have discussed only linear PDEs, although the full system
of coupled PDEs of nature is of course non-linear. This
in no way weakens our conclusions about only m = 1 giv-
ing well-posed initial value problems. When PDEs give
ill-posed problems even locally, in a small neighborhood
of a hypersurface (where we can generically approximate
the nonlinear PDEs with linear ones), it is obvious that
no nonlinear terms can make them well-posed in a larger
neighborhood. Contrariwise, adding nonlinear terms oc-
casionally makes well-posed problems ill-posed.
erty would be practically useless for a SAS at the point try-
ing to predict its surroundings, since the reconstruction is ill-
posed: it must measure f to infinitely many decimal places to
be able to make any predictions at all, since its Taylor series
requires knowledge of an infinite number of derivatives.
13The only remaining possibility is the rather contrived case
where data are specified on a null hypersurface. To measure
such data, a SAS would need to “live on the light cone”, i.e.,
travel with the speed of light, which means that it would sub-
jectively not perceive any time at all (its proper time would
stand still).
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We summarize this section as follows, graphically il-
lustrated in Figure 7. In our 1a TOE, there are math-
ematical structures with PE that have exactly our laws
of physics but with different space-time dimensionality.
It appears likely that all except the 3+1-dimensional one
are devoid of SASs, for the following reasons:
• More or less that 1 time dimension:
insufficient predictability.
• More than 3 space dimensions:
insufficient stability.
• Less than 3 space dimensions:
insufficient complexity.
Once again, these arguments are of course not to be inter-
preted as a rigorous proof. For instance, within the con-
text of specific models, one might consider exploring the
possibility of stable structures in the case (n,m) = (4, 1)
based on short distance quantum corrections to the 1/r2
potential or on string-like (rather than point-like) parti-
cles [51]. We have simply argued that it is far from obvi-
ous that any other combination than (n,m) = (3, 1) per-
mits SASs, since radical qualitative changes occur when
n or m is altered.
3. Including tachyonic particles
If spacetime were 1+3-dimensional instead of 3+1-
dimensional, space and time would effectively have in-
terchanged their roles, except that m2 in a Klein-Gordon
equation would have its sign reversed. In other words,
a 1+3-dimensional world would be just like ours except
that all particles would be tachyons, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 7.
Many of the original objections towards tachyons have
been shown to be unfounded [52], but it also appears pre-
mature to conclude that a world with tachyons could pro-
vide SASs with the necessary stability and predictability.
Initial value-problems are still well-posed when data is
given on a spacelike hypersurface, but new instabilities
appear. A photon of arbitrary energy could decay into
a tachyon-antitachyon pair [49], and the other forbid-
den decays that we discussed above (in the context of
multidimensional time) would also become allowed. In
addition, fluctuations in the Tachyon field of wavelength
above 1/m would be unstable and grow exponentially
rather than oscillate. This growth occurs on a timescale
1/m, so if our Universe had contained a Tachyon field
with m ∼> 1/1017 seconds, it would have dominated the
cosmic density and caused the Universe to recollapse in a
big crunch long ago. This is why the (n,m) = (1, 3) box
is tentatively part of the excluded region in Figure 7.
C. Other obvious things to change
Many other obvious small departures from our island
of habitability remain to be better explored in this frame-
work, for instance:
• Changing the spacetime topology, either on cosmo-
logical scales or on microscopical scales.
• Adding and removing low-mass particles (fields).
• Adding tachyonic particles (fields), as touched
upon above.
• Making more radical changes to the partial differ-
ential equations. The notion of hyperbolicity has
been generalized also to PDEs or order higher than
two, and also in these cases we would expect the
predictability requirement to impose a strong con-
straint. Fully linear equations (where all fields are
uncoupled) presumably lack the complexity nec-
essary for SASs, whereas non-linearity is notori-
ous for introducing instability and unpredictability
(chaos). In other words, it is not implausible that
there exists only a small number of possible sys-
tems of PDEs that balance between violating the
complexity constraint on one hand and violating
the predictability and stability constraints on the
other hand.
• Discretizing or q-deforming spacetime.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a “theory of everything” (TOE)
which is in a sense the ultimate ensemble theory. In
the Everett interpretation of nonrelativistic quantum me-
chanics, many macroscopically different states of the uni-
verse are all assumed to have physical existence (PE),
but the structure of spacetime, the physical constants
and the physical laws are assumed to be fixed. Some
quantum gravity conjectures [53] endow not only differ-
ent metrics but even different spacetime topologies with
PE. It has also been suggested that physical constants
may be different “after” a big crunch and a new big bang
[54], thus endowing models with say different coupling
constants and particle masses with PE, and this same
ensemble has been postulated to have PE based on a
wormhole physics argument [1]. It has been argued that
models with different effective space-time dimensionality
have PE, based on inflationary cosmology [2] or super-
string theory [5]. The “random dynamics” program of
Nielsen [55] has even endowed PE to worlds governed by
a limited class of different equations, corresponding to
different high-energy Lagrangeans. Our TOE takes this
ensemble enlargement to its extreme, and postulates that
all structures that exist in the mathematical sense (as de-
scribed in Section II) exist in the physical sense as well.
The elegance of this theory lies in its extreme simplic-
ity, since it contains neither any free parameters nor any
arbitrary assumptions about which of all mathematical
equations are assumed to be “the real ones”.
The picture is that some of these mathematical struc-
tures contain “self-aware substructures” (SASs), and that
we humans are an example of such SASs. To calculate
the physical predictions of the theory, we therefore need
to address the following questions:
1. Which structures contain SASs?
2. How do these SASs perceive the structures that
they are part of?
3. Given what we perceive, which mathematical struc-
tures are most likely to be the one that we inhabit?
4. Given specific experimental observations (percep-
tions), what are the probability distributions for
experimental outcomes when using Bayesean statis-
tics to reflect our lack of knowledge (as to which
structure we inhabit, as to measurement errors,
etc.)?
Needless to say, these are all difficult questions, and an
exhaustive answer to any one of them would of course
be far beyond the scope of a single paper. For example,
many person-years have already been spent on investi-
gating whether string theory is a candidate under item
3. In this paper, we have merely attempted to give an
introductory discussion of these four questions, and we
summarize our findings under the four headings below.
A. Which structures contain SASs?
As robust necessary conditions for the existence of
SASs, we proposed three criteria:
• Complexity
• Predictability
• Stability
The last two are clearly only meaningful for SAS that
“think” and thus subjectively perceive some form of time.
Using the terminology of Carter [15], we are asking how
large the “cognizable” part of the grand ensemble is. In
Section II, we set an upper limit on its size by explor-
ing the ensemble of all mathematical structures, thereby
placing Nozick’s notion [7] of “all logically acceptable
worlds” on a more rigorous footing. We noted that if
one keeps adding additional axioms to a formal system
in an attempt to increase its complexity, one generically
reaches a point where the balloon bursts: the formal sys-
tem becomes inconsistent, all WFFs become theorems,
and the mathematical structure becomes trivial and loses
all its complexity.
In Section IV, we replaced this “top-down” approach
with a “bottom-up” approach, making an overview of our
local neighborhood in “mathematics space”. The con-
straints summarized here were all from previously pub-
lished work except for a few new observations regarding
the dimensionality of time and space.
In the six-dimensional space spanned by the low-
energy-physics parameters αs, αw, α, αg, me/mp and
mn/mp, we found that an “archipelago” picture emerged
when assuming that the existence of SASs requires a cer-
tain minimum complexity, predictability and stability.
As has been frequently emphasized, the local “island of
habitability” to which our world belongs is quite small,
extending only over relative parameter variations of order
10−2. However, since the number of constraints for our
own particular existence is much greater than the number
of free parameters, we argued that it is likely that there
is an archipelago of many such small islands, correspond-
ing to different nuclear reaction chains in stellar burning
and different chemical compositions of the SASs. The
presence of a smaller number of much more severe con-
straints indicates that this archipelago also has an end,
so that large regions on parameter space are likely to be
completely devoid of SASs, and it is likely that the total
number if islands is finite.
In the discrete two-dimensional space corresponding
to different numbers of space and time dimensions, all
but the combination 3+1 appear to be “dead worlds”,
devoid of SASs. If there were more or less than one
time-dimension, the partial differential equations of na-
ture would lack the hyperbolicity property that enables
SASs to make predictions. If space has a dimensionality
exceeding three, there are no atoms or other stable struc-
tures. If space has a dimensionality of less than three, it
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is doubtful whether the world offers sufficient complexity
to support SASs (for instance, there is no gravitational
force).
We concluded that the requirements of complexity,
predictability and stability are extremely restrictive in
our “local neighborhood” of mathematical structures, so
it is not implausible that that islands of habitability are
small and rare elsewhere in “mathematics space” as well.
For this reason, it is not obvious that there is more than
a finite number of mathematical structures containing
SASs that are perceptibly different (according to their
SASs), so that it might even be possible to catalogue all
of them.
Many other obvious small departures from our island of
habitability remain to be better explored in this frame-
work, for instance changing the spacetime topology on
sub-horizon scales, adding and removing low-mass par-
ticles, adding tachyonic particles, making more radical
changes to the partial differential equations and discretiz-
ing or q-deforming spacetime.
B. How do SASs perceive the structures that they
are part of?
In Section III, we argued that the development of rela-
tivity theory and quantum mechanics has taught us that
we must carefully distinguish between two different views
of a mathematical structure:
• The bird perspective or outside view, which is the
way a mathematician views it.
• The frog perspective or inside view, which is the way
it is perceived by a SAS in it.
Understanding how to predict the latter from the former
is one of the major challenges in working out the quan-
titative predictions of our proposed TOE — and indeed
in working out the quantitative predictions of any phys-
ical theory which is based on mathematics. Perhaps the
best guide in addressing this question is what we have
(arguably) learned from previous successful theories:
• The correspondence between the two viewpoints
has become more subtle in each new theory (special
relativity, general relativity, quantum mechanics),
so we should expect it to be extremely subtle in a
quantum gravity theory and try to break all our
shackles of preconception as to what sort of math-
ematical structure we are looking for. Otherwise
we might not even recognize the correct equations
if we see them.
• We can only perceive those aspects of the mathe-
matical structure that are independent of our no-
tation for describing it. For instance, if the math-
ematical structure involves a manifold, a SAS can
only perceive properties that have general covari-
ance.
• We seem to perceive only those aspects of the struc-
ture (and of ourselves) which are useful to perceive,
i.e., which are relatively stable and predictable (this
is presumably because our design is related to Dar-
winian evolution).
– Example 1: We perceive ourselves as “lo-
cal” even if we are not. Although in the
bird perspective of general relativity we are
one-dimensional world lines in a static four-
dimensional manifold, we perceive ourselves
as points in a three-dimensional world where
things happen.
– Example 2: We perceive ourselves as stable
and permanent even if we are not. (We re-
place the bulk of both our hardware (cells)
and software (memories) many times in our
lifetime).
– Example 3: We perceive ourselves as unique
and isolated systems even if we are not. Al-
though in the bird perspective of univer-
sally valid quantum mechanics we can end up
in several macroscopically different configura-
tions at once, intricately entangled with other
systems, we perceive ourselves as remaining
unique isolated systems merely experiencing a
slight randomness.
• There can be ensembles within the ensemble: even
within a single mathematical structure (such as
quantum mechanics), different SASs can perceive
different and for all practical purposes independent
physical realities.
C. Which mathematical structure do we inhabit?
This question can clearly only be addressed by contin-
ued physics research along conventional lines, although
we probably need to complement mathematical and ex-
perimental efforts with more work on understanding the
correspondence between the inside and outside view-
points.
Since some aspects of complex mathematical struc-
tures can often be approximated by simpler ones, we
might never be able to determine precisely which one
we are part of. However, if this should turn out to be
the case, it clearly will not matter, since we can then
obtain all possible physical predictions by just assuming
that our structure is the simplest of the candidates.
D. Calculating probability distributions
All predictions of this theory take the form of probabil-
ity distributions for the outcomes of future observations,
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as formally given by equation (6). This equation basi-
cally states that the probability distribution for observ-
ing X a time ∆t after observing Y is a sum giving equal
weight to all mathematical structures that are consistent
with both X and Y . As mentioned in the introduction,
this is in fact quite similar to how predictions are made
with 1b TOEs, the difference being simply that the sum
is extended over all mathematical structures rather than
just a single one or some small selection. It is convenient
to discard all mathematical structures that do obviously
not contain SASs once and for all, as this greatly cuts
down the number of structures to sum over. This is why
it is useful to identify and weed out “dead worlds” as
was done in section IV. After this first cut, all additional
observations about the nature of our world of course pro-
vide additional cuts in the number of structures to sum
over.
E. Arguments against this theory
Here we discuss a few obvious objections to the pro-
posed theory.
1. The falsifiability argument
Using Popper’s falsifiability requirement, one might ar-
gue that “this TOE does not qualify as a scientific theory,
since it cannot be experimentally ruled out”. In fact, a
moment of consideration reveals that this argument is
false. The TOE we have proposed makes a large number
of statistical predictions, and therefore can eventually be
ruled out at high confidence levels if it is incorrect, us-
ing prediction 1 from the introduction as embodied in
equation (6). Prediction 2 from the introduction offers
additional ways of ruling it out that other theories lack.
Such rejections based on a single observation are analo-
gous to those involving statistical predictions of quantum
mechanics: Suppose that we prepare a silver atom with
its spin in the z-direction and then measure its spin in
a direction making an angle of θ = 3◦ with the z-axis.
Since the theory predicts the outcome to be “spin up”
with a probability cos2 θ/2, a single observation of “spin
down” would imply that quantum mechanics had been
ruled out at a confidence level exceeding 99.9%.14 In-
stead, the falsifiability argument can be applied against
14 Indeed, the author once thought that this TOE was ruled
out by the observation that space is three-dimensional, since
if all higher dimensionalities were at least as habitable for
SASs as our own, the a priori probability of our living in a
space so near the bottom of the list would be virtually zero.
The theory is saved merely because of Ehrenfest’s observation
that n > 3 precludes atoms, which the author was unaware
of at the time (and independently rediscovered, just as many
rival TOEs in category 1b, as discussed in Section VF4
below.
2. The pragmatism argument
One might argue that “this TOE is useless in practice,
since it cannot make any interesting predictions”. This
argument is also incorrect. First of all, if only one math-
ematical structure should turn out to be consistent with
all our observations, then we will with 100% certainty
know that this is the one we inhabit, and the 1a TOE
will give identical predictions to the 1b TOE that grants
only this particular structure PE. Secondly, probabilis-
tic calculations as to which structure we inhabit can also
provide quantitative predictions. It was such Bayesean
reasoning that enabled Hoyle to predict the famous 7.7
MeV resonance in the C12 nucleus [34], and we would
expect the derived probability distributions to be quite
narrow in other cases as well when parameters appear
in exponentials. Although many in principle interesting
calculations (such as the high-resolution version of Fig-
ure 5 suggested above) are numerically very difficult at
the present stage, there are also areas where this type
of calculations do not appear to be unfeasibly difficult.
The parameters characterizing cosmological initial condi-
tions provide one such example where work has already
been done [13,4]. Shedding more light on the question of
whether or not particle physicists should expect a “mass
desert” up to near the Planck scale might also be possible
by a systematic study of the extent to which “generic”
models are consistent with our low-energy observations
[55].
When it comes to discrete parameters, our TOE in fact
makes some strikingly specific a priori predictions given
the other laws of physics, such as that our spacetime
should be 3+1-dimensional (see Figure 7). Thus an ex-
tremely prodigal new-born baby could in principle, before
opening its eyes for the first time, paraphrase Descartes
by saying “cogito, ergo space is three-dimensional”.
3. The economy argument
One might argue that this TOE is vulnerable to Oc-
cam’s razor, since it postulates the existence of other
worlds that we can never observe. Why should nature be
so wasteful and indulge in such opulence as to contain an
infinite plethora of different worlds?
Intriguingly, this argument can be turned around to
argue for our TOE. When we feel that nature is waste-
ful according to this theory, what precisely are we dis-
turbed about her wasting? Certainly not “space”, since
others have).
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we are perfectly willing to accept a single Friedmann-
Robertson-Walker Universe with an infinite volume, most
of which we can never observe — we accept that this un-
observable space has PE since it allows a simpler theory.
Certainly not “mass” or “atoms”, for the same reason
— once you have wasted an infinite amount of some-
thing, who cares if you waste some more? Rather, it is
probably the apparent reduction in simplicity that ap-
pears disturbing, the quantity of information necessary
to specify all these unseen worlds. However, as is dis-
cussed in more detail in [56], an entire ensemble is of-
ten much simpler than one of its members, which can be
stated more formally using the notion of algorithmic in-
formation content [57,58], also referred to as algorithmic
complexity. For instance, the algorithmic information in
a number is roughly speaking defined as the length (in
bits) of the shortest computer program which will pro-
duce that number as output, so the information content
in a generic integer n is of order log2 n. Nonetheless, the
set of all integers 1, 2, 3, ... can be generated by quite a
trivial computer program [59], so the algorithmic com-
plexity of the whole set is smaller than that of a generic
member. Similarly, the set of all perfect fluid solutions
to the Einstein field equations has a smaller algorithmic
complexity than a generic particular solution, since the
former is specified simply by giving a few equations and
the latter requires the specification of vast amounts of
initial data on some hypersurface. Loosely speaking, the
apparent information content rises when we restrict our
attention to one particular element in an ensemble, thus
losing the symmetry and simplicity that was inherent in
the totality of all elements taken together. In this sense,
our “ultimate ensemble” of all mathematical structures
has virtually no algorithmic complexity at all. Since it
is merely in the frog perspective, in the subjective per-
ceptions of SASs, that this opulence of information and
complexity is really there, one can argue that an ensem-
ble theory is in fact more economical than one endowing
only a single ensemble element with PE [56].
F. Arguments against the rival theories
Here we discuss some objections to rival TOEs. The
first two arguments are against those in Category 2, and
the second two against those in Category 1b.
1. The success of mathematics in the physical sciences
In a his famous essay “The Unreasonable Effectiveness
of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences” [60], Wigner ar-
gues that “the enormous usefulness of mathematics in
the natural sciences is something bordering on the mys-
terious”, and that “there is no rational explanation for
it”. This can be used as an argument against TOEs in
category 2. For 1a and 1b TOEs, on the other hand,
the usefulness of mathematics for describing the physical
world is a natural consequence of the fact that the latter
is a mathematical structure. The various approximations
that constitute our current physics theories are success-
ful because simple mathematical structures can provide
good approximations of how a SAS will perceive more
complex mathematical structures. In other words, our
successful theories are not mathematics approximating
physics, but mathematics approximating mathematics!
In our category 1a TOE, Wigner’s question about why
there are laws of physics that we are able to discover
follows from the above-mentioned predictability require-
ment. In short, we can paraphrasing Descartes: “Cogito,
ergo lex.”
2. The generality of mathematics
A second challenge for defenders of a Category 2 TOE
is that mathematics is far more than the study of num-
bers that is taught in school. The currently popular for-
malist definition of mathematics as the study of formal
systems [61] (which is reflected in our discussion of math-
ematical structures in Section II) is so broad that for all
practical purposes, any TOE that is definable in purely
formal terms (independent of vague human terminology)
will fall into Category 1 rather than 2. For instance, a
TOE involving a set of different types of entities (denoted
by words, say) and relations between them (denoted by
additional words) is nothing but what mathematicians
call a set-theoretical model, and one can generally find
a formal system that it is a model of. Since proponents
of a Category 2 TOE must argue that some aspects of
it are not mathematical, they must thus maintain that
the world is in some sense not describable at all. Physi-
cists would thus be wasting their time looking for such
a TOE, and one can even argue about whether such a
TOE deserves to be called a theory in the first place.
3. The smallness of our island
If the archipelago of habitability covers merely an
extremely small fraction of our local neighborhood of
“mathematics space”, then a Category 1b TOE would
provide no explanation for the “miracle” that the pa-
rameter values of the existing world happen to lie in the
range allowing SASs. For instance, if nuclear physics
calculations were to show that stellar heavy element pro-
duction requires 1/137.5 < α < 1/136.5 and a 1b TOE
would produce a purely numerological calculation based
on gravity quantization giving α = 1/137.0359895, then
this “coincidence” would probably leave many physicists
feeling disturbed. Why should the existence of life arise
from a remarkable feat of fine-tuning on the part of na-
ture? However, in all fairness, we must bear in mind
that extreme smallness of the archipelago (and indeed
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even extreme smallness of our own island) has not been
convincingly demonstrated, as stressed by e.g. [62]. Even
the dimensionality observation mentioned in footnote 14
hardly qualifies as such a fine-tuning argument, since a
small integer appearing from a calculation would appear
far less arbitrary than an enormous integer or a number
like 137.0359895. Rather, we mention this fine tuning is-
sue simply to encourage actual calculations of how small
the islands are.
4. Physical nonexistence is a scientifically meaningless
concept
The claim that some mathematical structure (different
from ours) does not have physical existence is an empiri-
cally completely useless statement, since it does not lead
to any testable predictions, not even probabilistic ones.
Nonetheless, it is precisely such claims that all TOEs in
category 1b must make to distinguish themselves from
the 1a TOE. This makes them vulnerable to Popper’s
criticism of not qualifying as physical theories, since this
aspect of them is not falsifiable. As an example, let us
suppose that a detailed calculation shows that only five
tiny islands in Figure 5 allow heavy element production
in stars, with a total area less than 10−6 of the total in the
plot. In a 1b TOE predicting the observed values, this
would not allow us to say that the theory had been ruled
out with 99.9999% significance, nor at any significance
level at all, simply because, contrary to the 1a TOE,
there is no ensemble from which probabilities emerge.
However uncomfortable we might feel about the seeming
“miracle” that the theory happened to predict parame-
ter values allowing life, a defender of the theory could
confidently ignore our unease, knowing that the claimed
nonexistence of worlds with other parameter values could
never be falsified.
Moreover, purely philosophical arguments about
whether certain mathematical structures have PE or not
(which is the sole difference between 1a and 1b TOEs)
appear about as pointless as the medieval purely philo-
sophical arguments about whether there is a God or not,
when we consider that the entire notion of PE is painfully
poorly defined. Would most physicists attribute PE to
galaxies outside of our horizon volume? To unobserv-
able branches of the wavefunction? If a mathematical
structure contains a SAS, then the claim that it has PE
operationally means that this SAS will perceive itself as
existing in a physically real world, just as we do15. For
the many other mathematical structures that correspond
15 We could eliminate the whole notion of PE from our TOE
by simply rephrasing it as “if a mathematical structure con-
tains a SAS, it will perceive itself as existing in a physically
real world”.
to dead worlds with no SASs there to behold them, for
instance the 4+1-dimensional (atom-free) analog of our
world, who cares whether they have PE or not? In fact,
as discussed in [56] and above in Section VE 3, the total-
ity of all worlds is much less complex than such a specific
world, and it is only in the subjective frog perspective
of SASs that seemingly complex structures such as trees
and stellar constellations exist at all. Thus in this sense,
not even the pines and the Big Dipper of our world would
exist if neither we nor any other SASs were here to per-
ceive them. The answer to Hawking’s question “what is
it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a Uni-
verse for them to describe?” [63] would then be “you, the
SAS”.
Further attacking the distinction between physical and
mathematical existence, one can speculate that future
physicists will find the 1a TOE to be true tautologically16.
16 Penrose has raised the following question [64]. Suppose
that a machine “android” were built that simulated a human
being so accurately that her friends could not tell the differ-
ence. Would it be self-aware, i.e., subjectively feel like she
does? If the answer to this question is yes (in accordance
with Leibniz’ “identity of indiscernibles” [21]), then as de-
scribed below, it might be untenable to make any distinction
at all between physical existence and mathematical existence,
so that our TOE would in fact be tautologically true.
Let us imagine a hypothetical Universe much larger than our
own, which contains a computer so powerful that it can simu-
late the time-evolution of our entire Universe. By hypothesis,
the humans in this simulated world would perceive their world
as being as real as we perceive ours, so by definition, the sim-
ulated universe would have PE. Technical objections such as
an infinite quantity of information being required to store the
data appear to be irrelevant to the philosophical point that
we will make. For instance, there is nothing about the physics
we know today that suggests that the Universe could not be
replaced by a discrete and finite model that approximated it
so closely that we, its inhabitants, could not tell the differ-
ence. That a vast amount of CPU-time would be needed is
irrelevant, since that time bears no relation to the subjective
time that the inhabitants of the Universe would perceive. In
fact, since we can choose to picture our Universe not as a 3D
world where things happen, but as a 4D world that merely
is, there is no need for the computer to compute anything at
all — it could simply store all the 4D data, and the “simu-
lated” world would still have PE. Clearly the way in which
the data are stored should not matter, so the amount of PE
we attribute to the stored Universe should be invariant under
data compression. The physical laws provide a great means
of data compression, since they make it sufficient to store the
initial data at some time together with the equations and an
integration routine. In fact, this should suffice even if the
computer lacks the CPU power and memory required to per-
form the decompression. The initial data might be simple as
well [56], containing so little algorithmic information that a
single CD-ROM would suffice to store it. After all, all that
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This would be a natural extension of a famous analogy
by Eddington [28]:
• One might say that wherever there is light, there
are associated ripples in the electromagnetic field.
But the modern view is that light is the ripples.
• One might say that wherever there is matter, there
are associated ripples in the metric known as cur-
vature. But Eddington’s view is that matter is the
ripples.
• One might say that wherever there is PE, there is
an associated mathematical structure. But accord-
ing to our TOE, physical existence is the mathe-
matical structure.
G. And now what?
If the TOE we have proposed is correct, then what
are the implications? As mentioned, answering the ques-
tion of which mathematical structure we inhabit requires
“business as usual” in terms of continuing theoretical and
experimental research. However, there are also a num-
ber of implications for how we should focus our physics
research, as summarized below.
1. Don’t mock e.g. string theorists
In coffee rooms throughout the world, derogatory re-
marks are often heard to the effect that certain physics
theories (string theory, quantum groups, certain ap-
proaches to quantum gravity, occasionally also grand uni-
fied and supersymmetric theories), are mere mathemati-
cal diversions, having nothing to do with physical reality.
According to our TOE, all such mathematical structures
have physical existence if they are self-consistent, and
therefore merit our study unless it can be convincingly
the needs to be stored is a description of the mathematical
structure that is isomorphic to the simulated universe. Now
the ultimate question forces itself upon us: for this Universe
to have PE, is the CD-ROM really needed at all? If this magic
CD-ROM could be contained within the simulated Universe
itself, then it would “recursively” support its own PE. This
would not involve any catch-22 “hen-and-egg” problem re-
garding whether the CD-ROM or the Universe existed first,
since the Universe is a 4D structure which just is (“creation”
is of course only a meaningful notion within a spacetime). In
summary, a mathematical structure with SASs would have
PE if it could be described purely formally (to a computer,
say) — and this is of course little else than having mathemat-
ical existence. Some closely related arguments can be found
in [21].
demonstrated that their properties preclude the existence
of SASs 17.
2. Compute probability distributions for everything
One obvious first step toward more quantitative predic-
tions from this TOE is to explore the parameter space of
the various continuous and discrete physical parameters
in more detail, to map out the archipelago of potential
habitable islands. For instance, by using a crude model
for how the relevant nuclear spectra depend on α and
αs, one should attempt to map out the various islands
allowing an unbroken reaction chain for heavy element
production in stars, thereby refining Figure 5. If the is-
lands should turn out to cover only a tiny fraction of the
parameter space, it would become increasingly difficult
to believe in category 1b TOEs. As mentioned, this type
of calculation also offers a way to test and perhaps rule
out the TOE that we are proposing.
3. Study the formal structure
Since all mathematical structures are a priori given
equal statistical weight, it is important to study the
purely formal nature of the mathematical models that
we propose. Would adding, changing or removing a few
axioms produce an observationally equally viable model?
For instance, if there is a large class of much more generic
mathematical structures that would give identical pre-
dictions for low-energy physics but that would deviate
at higher energies, then we would statistically expect to
find such a deviation when our colliders become able to
probe these energy scales. (Here we of course meanmath-
ematical axioms, as in section II, not informal “axioms”
regarding the correspondence between the mathematics
and our observations, such as “Axiom 3 of the Copen-
hagen interpretation of quantum mechanics”.)
17 Although it is often said that “there are many perfectly
good theories that simply turn out to be inconsistent with
some experimental fact”, this statement is certainly exagger-
ated. The fact of the matter is that we to date have found no
self-consistent mathematical structure that can demonstra-
bly describe both quantum and general relativistic phenom-
ena. Classical physics was certainly not “a perfectly good
theory”, since it could not even account for electromagnetism
with sources in a self-consistent way, and predicted that Hy-
drogen atoms would collapse in a fraction of a second. In
1920, Herman Weyl remarked that “the problem of matter is
still shrouded in the deepest gloom” [65], and classical physics
never became any better.
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4. Don’t waste time on “numerology”
A popularly held belief is that the dimensionless pa-
rameters of nature will turn out to be computable from
first principles. For instance, Eddington spent years of
his life developing theories where α was exactly 1/136 and
exactly 1/137, respectively. If the above-mentioned anal-
ysis of heavy element production in stars were to reveal
that the archipelago of habitability covered only a tiny
fraction of the parameter space in Figure 5, then within
the framework of our TOE, we would conclude that it
is highly unlikely that α is given by “numerology”, and
concentrate our research efforts elsewhere.
5. Shun classical prejudice
Since all mathematical structures have PE in this the-
ory, it of course allows no sympathy whatsoever for sub-
jective nostalgic bias towards structures that resemble
cozy classical concepts. For instance, criticism of the
Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics for being
“too crazy” falls into this forbidden category. Similarly,
a model clearly cannot be criticized for involving “unnec-
essarily large” ensembles.
6. Don’t neglect the frog perspective
Considering how difficult it is to predict how a math-
ematical structure will be perceived by a SAS, a system-
atic study of this issue probably merits more attention
than it is currently receiving. In the current era of spe-
cialization, where it is easy to get engrossed in mathe-
matical technicalities, substantial efforts in phenomenol-
ogy are needed to make the connection with observation,
going well beyond simply computing cross sections and
decay rates.
H. Outlook
Even if we are eventually able to figure out which
mathematical structure we inhabit, which in the termi-
nology of Weinberg [8] corresponds to discovering “the
final theory” (note that our usage of ‘the word “theory”
is slightly different), our task as physicists is far from
over. In Weinberg’s own words [8]: “Wonderful phenom-
ena, from turbulence to thought, will still need exploration
whatever final theory is discovered. The discovery of a fi-
nal theory will not necessarily even help very much in
making progress in understanding these phenomena [...].
A final theory will be final in only one sense — it will
bring to an end a certain sort of science, the ancient
search for those principles that cannot be explained in
terms of deeper principles.”
If the TOE proposed in this paper is indeed correct,
then the search for the ultimate principles has ended in a
slight anti-climax: finding the TOE was easy, but work-
ing out its experimental implications is probably difficult
enough to keep physicists and mathematicians occupied
for generations to come.
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